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ENDANGERED CLAIMS

BROOKE D. COLEMAN*
ABSTRACT
Litigants—like organisms in an ecosystem—must evolve to survive
our civil justice system. When procedural rules and doctrines that
govern civil litigation change, litigants must respond. In some cases,
litigants will adapt to the rules. In others, they will migrate to alternative fora to capitalize on the new environment’s rules. For those
who cannot adapt or migrate, their claims will go extinct.
This Article chronicles the evolution story of federal civil litigation
by examining how, in response to changing procedural rules and doctrines, parties and their claims adapt, migrate, or go extinct. It shows
that throughout this evolution, claims by the most resourced parties
survive while claims by less resourced parties do not. This leads to
the Article’s second contribution, which concerns implications for
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policymakers. If policymakers understand that, despite the procedural rules or doctrines they adopt, the most powerful litigants will
almost always find a way to survive, that understanding should
change how policymakers approach their work. More specifically,
this Article argues that policymakers should abandon their distorted
survival-of-the-fittest approach to procedural reform and instead
adopt an Endangered Claims Act approach. Using such an approach, policymakers’ choices would be guided by meritorious claim
conservation. Thus, if a procedural change would lead to claim
extinction, policymakers would not pursue that change, even if it
would otherwise benefit powerful litigants. Finally, to best implement
this methodology, policymakers—like scientists observing a species
in the wild—will need better information about how claims fare in
our civil justice system. Obtaining that information will require
greater data-gathering resources and a commitment to, where possible, funneling claims into public courts where they can be better
monitored.
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INTRODUCTION
The Florida Panther, or Puma concolor coryi, is a 150-pound cat
that once roamed the southeastern United States in great numbers.1
With the advent of unregulated hunting and sprawling development
into their natural habitat,2 the number of panthers dwindled to a
population size of approximately fifty cats.3 In 1967, the Florida
Panther was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species
Act.4 The population has since recovered to almost triple its low
point.5 The panther is still endangered, but conservation efforts are
working to preserve this majestic animal.6
This Article argues that, much like the Florida Panther, claims
made by federal litigants are subject to evolutionary pressures.
These pressures emerge within the litigation habitat, and one significant source of pressure is procedure.7 As procedural rules governing federal civil litigation change, parties must overcome them.8
In some cases, the parties will adapt to the rules. In others, they
will migrate to other fora to capitalize on the new environment’s
rules.9 For those litigants who cannot adapt or migrate, their claims
will go extinct.10
1. Florida Panther, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS., ENV’L CONSERVATION ONLINE SYS.,
https://www.ecos.fws.gov/species/1763 [https://perma.cc/F5BT-RP3T].
2. See Florida Panther Facts, BIG CAT RESCUE (Jan. 10, 2020), https://bigcatrescue.org/
florida-panther-facts/ [https://perma.cc/WEL2-MR33]. Big Cat Rescue is the organization
featured heavily in the recent Netflix phenom of a series, Tiger King. See Tiger King: Murder,
Mayhem and Madness, (Netflix 2020), https://www.netflix.com/title/81115994 [https://
perma.cc/A2AC-MJTU].
3. Florida Panther, ENDANGERED SPECIES COAL., https://www.endangered.org/animals/
florida-panther/ [https://perma.cc/SQF5-MBYU].
4. Native Fish and Wildlife Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967).
5. Florida Panther, supra note 3.
6. Florida Panther, supra note 1.
7. Additional pressure points, while not the focus of this Article, are discussed briefly
infra Part I.B.
8. See generally Joseph F. Marinelli, New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: What’s the Big Idea?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/02/07_marinelli [https://perma.cc/4NFV-PSEV]
(grappling with possible applications of the 2015 revisions to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
9. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting
a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 106 (1999).
10. See id. at 109-10.
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Class action waivers in forced arbitration agreements show this
evolution in action.11 First, arguing that arbitration was a preferable
form of resolving disputes and garnering federal courts’ support to
do so, corporate defendants migrated to arbitration.12 Second, within
arbitration, these same defendants sought an evolutionary advantage by including class action waivers in their agreements.13 Third,
plaintiffs initially fought both forced arbitration clauses and the
class action waiver, but have since lost those battles, which resulted
in some claims going extinct.14 Finally, accepting their new environment but also believing in the advantage of collective action, some
plaintiffs, like those in DoorDash and similar arbitrations, have
banded together to file mass simultaneous individual arbitration
claims.15 This adaptation has enabled some parties to effectively
aggregate their claims and gain back a portion of their lost advantage.16
But there are untold numbers of litigants who are unable to
survive this and other similar procedural evolutions. Their claims
are endangered and, without some form of intervention, will go
11. J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (2006).
12. Id. (“As judicial support of arbitration as a means of commercial dispute resolution
grew, U.S. businesses quickly began imposing arbitration in contexts previously thought to
prohibit the use of such a method of dispute resolution.”).
13. Id. at 1746-47.
14. See generally Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and
Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 650 (2018)
(“Between July of 2009 and June of 2014, we identified a total of 134 claims against AT&T,
or an average of 27 per year brought by consumers. During that same time period, AT&T had
between 85 and 120 million customers. By 2016, AT&T’s customer base had grown to some
147 million. The 2014-2017 review identified 316 claims against AT&T (or 105 per year)
closed in the three years ending June of 2017.”).
15. Erin Mulvaney, DoorDash Ordered into Individual Arbitration with 5,000 Workers,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 10, 2020, 9:24 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
doordash-ordered-into-individual-arbitration-with-5-000-workers?context=article-related
[https://perma.cc/TEP8-RNCD]; see infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
16. However, the arbitration defendants have ensnared these actions in court with
challenges to the validity of mass arbitration filings. See Alison Frankel, Chegg Tries a New
Way to Avert Mass Arbitration: Cancel Users’ Contracts, REUTERS (July 2, 2020, 3:52 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-massarb/chegg-tries-a-new-way-to-avert-massarbitration-cancel-users-contracts-idUSKBN24333W [https://perma.cc/HVR6-FM8D]
(chronicling arbitration defendants’ responses, including the refusal to pay arbitration fees,
the invocation of a class device (even after prohibiting it in the arbitration agreements), and
the use of different courts when the answer sought is not forthcoming from the first court).
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extinct. For every class action waiver and DoorDash response, there
are myriad claims in which the parties are unable to adapt and
survive.17 The parties that endure often have abundant resources.18
In contrast, those with endangered claims—the parties who lack
financial backing and social power—do not.19
This hostile litigation environment is not some natural consequence of our civil justice ecosystem. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Civil Rules Committee play a key role in
this evolution because they collectively define the parameters of
procedural doctrine.20 Yet these policymakers have unclear motivations when it comes to the procedures they introduce.21 In some
cases, these policymakers ostensibly fail to recognize, or perhaps
reject as inconsequential, the fact that a procedural change will
force parties to adapt or else see their claims become extinct.22 In
other cases, policymakers seem to condone, and even encourage, this
evolution whether it be migration of claims or complete extinction.23
The result, this Article argues, is a litigation system that is fragmented, unfair, and undemocratic. Like extremist takes on Darwinism,24 the evolution taking place in our federal civil justice system
17. See Algero, supra note 9, at 104-05.
18. See Alex Campbell & Kendall Taggart, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Claiming Austin
Illegally Jails Poor People, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 11:38 AM), https://www.
buzzfeednews.com/article/alexcampbell/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-claiming-austin-illegally-jailspoor [https://perma.cc/ZL3S-PTA5] (dismissing a class action lawsuit brought by individuals
jailed for inability to pay without adjudicating the merits).
19. See id.
20. When the Court adjudicates a case before it, as opposed to participating in the civil
rulemaking process as one of many bodies who approve the rules, it is not a policymaker per
se. Yet, even when adjudicating, it relies on policy considerations to define procedural
parameters. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 129 (2015)
(“From Wal-Mart to Twombly, it is the fact-intensive, merits-determining tendency of the
Roberts Court that defines the worst elements of its Rules decisions.”). Congress legislates
procedural doctrines, and finally, the Civil Rules Committee is the primary body responsible
for maintaining and amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
21. See Rhonda McMillion, ABA Opposes Tort Reform Bills that Amend Court Rules and
Limit Damages, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 1, 2017, 12:40 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/aba_opposes_tort_reform_bills [https://perma.cc/6V2W-TZEE].
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Do’s and Don’ts of Tort Reform, CATO INST. (May 1, 2005),
https://www.cato.org/commentary/dos-donts-tort-reform [https://perma.cc/ECR8-EXPU].
24. See William Irons, Darwin and Morality, NW. UNIV., https://www.northwestern.
edu/onebook/the-reluctant-mr-darwin/essays/darwin-morality.html [https://perma.cc/WCH5PDAR] (“The core idea of Social Darwinism is that the wealthy and powerful enjoy the
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is distressing. And like the endangered species on our planet, we
should pay more attention to the plight of these endangered
claims.25
This Article makes two contributions. First, it chronicles the
evolution story of federal civil litigation by examining how, in
response to changes in procedural rules and doctrines, parties and
their claims adapt, migrate, or go extinct. What emerges from this
story is that often only the strongest and most powerful parties
survive, while those with fewer resources are less successful. These
lost claims, like a lost species, should raise concerns. This leads to
the second contribution, which concerns implications for policymakers.
If policymakers understand that, despite the procedural rules or
doctrines that are adopted, the most powerful litigants will almost
always find a way to survive, that understanding should shift how
policymakers approach their work. More specifically, this Article
argues that policymakers should be guided by a commitment to
meritorious claim conservation. The Endangered Species Act was
adopted to protect our natural ecosystems by preventing animal
extinction.26 Similarly, policymakers should use an Endangered
Claims Act framework to protect our civil justice system by conserving claims.
In action, policymakers must cease responding to power and
instead respond to the claim. Meritorious claims, especially those
that are the bulwark of our collective public interest—claims such
privileges they do because they are more fit in terms of the traits favored by natural
selection.... [I]t is best to let [the poor and powerless] perish since their elimination will
represent natural selection.... This line of thinking ... was used to justify colonialism, extreme
laissez-faire capitalism, ... aggressive militarism ... [and] sterilization of those deemed
mentally or morally defective.”); François Haas, German Science and Black Racism—Roots
of the Nazi Holocaust, 22 FASEB J. 332, 332-33 (2008); H.W. Koch, Social Darwinism as a
Factor in the ‘New Imperialism’, in THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 319, 337 (H.W.
Koch ed., 2d ed. 1984).
25. See Florida Panther Facts, supra note 2.
26. See Jan G. Laitos & Andrew Swan, The Growing Role of Nonuse Values in Land Use
Planning and Environmental Law, 63 PLAN. & ENV’T L. 3, 8 (2011) (“The federal Endangered
Species Act (ESA) ... is the most familiar and heralded statute whose primary purpose is not
to benefit humans, but to protect living things that inhabit the planet’s biosphere alongside
humans. The purpose of the ESA is ‘to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668 dd-668 ee)).
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as discrimination, product liability, and section 1983—should be
subject to procedural rules that anticipate potential adaptations
or migrations. By anticipating the effect a procedural rule change
will have on meritorious claims, policymakers might re-think the
changes they make. For instance, in the DoorDash example, adaptations by clever plaintiffs’ lawyers might allow some claims to
survive;27 yet, how many similar claims—where parties did not have
the necessary resources and lawyers—have gone extinct? In addition, for the DoorDash claims that will be arbitrated (or adjudicated), how much time and money did the parties and the system
waste to get to that point?28 If policymakers are required to focus on
the claim itself, they will better anticipate how meritorious claims
might fare whenever a procedural change is made.
Anticipating how procedural reform will impact claims will
require more than mere focus, though. To implement this Endangered Claims Act approach, policymakers will also need better
information.29 Some of this information can be gleaned by simply
putting more resources behind data gathering in our federal civil
justice system.30 The Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the Courts already do some modest data gathering, but
for policymakers to have the information they need, those entities
will require robust support.31 In addition, to maximize our ability to
monitor how claims are faring, policymakers should endeavor to
adopt procedural rules and doctrines that guide most claims into a
27. See Mulvaney, supra note 15.
28. See Frankel, supra note 16.
29. See Clifton Barnes, Tort Reform Momentum Slowed But Not Stopped, AM. BAR ASS’N
(2005), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/
bar_leader/2004_05/2906/momentum [https://perma.cc/V2P6-HWCS].
30. See generally id. (pointing to proponents of medical malpractice who claimed “frivolous
lawsuits and high awards ... drive insurance cost up,” while data showed that average medical
malpractice awards declined while insurance rates doubled).
31. Jennifer L. Thurston, Black Robes, White Judges: The Lack of Diversity on the
Magistrate Judge Bench, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (2019) (“[T]he AO reports only broad
categories.... [T]he data from the FJC did not easily compare to the data provided by the
AO.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-95-236BR, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: OBSERVATIONS
ON SELECTED ISSUES 96 (1995) (“[T]he AO ‘cannot hope in some circumstances to give a
thoroughly objective appraisal of what needs to be done, because such an objective appraisal
may meet with considerable criticism from members of the judiciary.’” (excerpting letter from
Rya W. Zobel, Dir., Fed. Jud. Ctr., to Norman J. Rabkin, Dir., Admin. of Just. Issues 4 (Aug.
18, 1995))).
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public court system. While imperfect, public courts are far more
amenable to monitoring and data gathering than private dispute
resolution fora like arbitration.32 This is not to say that all claims
must be adjudicated in public courts, but in procedural reform,
policymakers should put a thumb on the scale in favor of more, not
less, public adjudication.
Part I of the Article outlines the systemic and procedural pressures that work to endanger claims. Part II then examines the
evolution of procedure in action. It chronicles some of the most
prominent examples of litigants and their claims evolving, migrating, and even going extinct. Part III then problematizes this
evolution by arguing that the current evolutionary environment
favors traits like money, influence, and power, thereby endangering
claims brought by those who are without such advantages. It argues
that policymakers are preferencing the wrong evolutionary attributes. To optimize procedural reform, policymakers should instead
use an Endangered Claims Act framework to consider how new
procedures will impact claims.
I. CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM INPUTS
The civil justice system is a complex ecosystem. The parties and
lawyers that operate within the system are similarly complex. This
Part examines how procedure—while only one factor affecting the
ecosystem—is critical to determining how parties and their lawyers
behave within the civil justice system. This Part also briefly outlines
other non-procedure pressures that impact the system and notes
that even if changes were made to how procedural reforms were
implemented, those non-procedure pressures might still persist.

32. See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS
OF THEIR RIGHTS 15 (2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/
[https://perma.cc/MTE9-3YBT] (noting “data on the incidence of mandatory arbitration
gathered in any of the official government surveys of employers” is not required to be
reported).
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A. Procedural Inputs
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related procedural
doctrines shape litigation in the federal courts. Prior to the adoption
of the Federal Rules in 1938, a federal court followed the same
procedures as the state courts where that federal court sat.33 In this
way, the parties and lawyers in each state had an advantage
because they knew the rules of their game better than any outsiders.34 The adoption of the 1938 rules changed the environment in
federal courts.35 State-centric lawyers and their federal-court clients
lost their procedural advantage.36 Consequently, lawyers who could
become experts in the now-uniform federal rules gained an advantage over those parochial attorneys who knew only their home-court
rules.
In this way, the advent of the 1938 rules was the first point of
adaptation in our modern procedural regime. Those lawyers and
their clients who adapted to the uniform set of federal procedural
rules had an advantage over those who did not.37 As this Article will
discuss, the evolution did not stop once the new federal rules were
adopted.38 Procedure remains a driving force behind how the civil
justice system works.39 Studies show that attorneys and their clients
prefer federal or state court, for example, based in part on what they
perceive to be a procedural advantage.40 They might know the rules
33. Before the 1938 rules, federal courts under the Conformity Act of 1872 were required
to apply the procedural rules of the state in which they sat. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255,
§ 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
34. Although, even local lawyers were often frustrated by practicing under the Conformity
Act. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1041
(1982) (“[A] federal practitioner ‘even in his own state, f[elt] not more certainty as to the
proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting 19 A.B.A. REP. 411, 420 (1896))).
35. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 708
(2016).
36. See id. at 734.
37. See id.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 2101, 2162 (2019).
40. Id. (“Since the early 1990s, however, a series of studies exploring attorney preferences
has consistently found that plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer to litigate in state court and institutional defendants in federal court.”); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in
Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 395-
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better or simply believe that the rules benefit them.41 Whatever the
reason, the rules matter.
Lobbying efforts on behalf of legal interest groups demonstrate
litigants’ beliefs that procedure is an important lever in civil litigation.42 For example, when the 2016 discovery amendments were
under consideration, over 2,300 comments were received and 120
individuals testified to the rulemaking committee.43 The list of
commentators is chock full of corporate general counsel, chambers
of commerce, plaintiffs’ groups, and academics.44 Similar lobbying
efforts in Congress have led to sweeping procedural reform through
legislation such as the Class Action Fairness Act.45 If procedure was
inconsequential, these rule changes and legislation would go largely
unnoticed. That is hardly the case.

96 (1992) (presenting survey results of defendants’ preference for federal court).
41. See Miller, supra note 40, at 395-96.
42. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 29.
43. Paul W. Grimm, Introduction: Reflections on the Future of Discovery in Civil Cases,
71 VAND. L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2018) (“And certainly, from the more than 2,300 written
comments and testimony of 120 witnesses at the public hearings, the proportionality requirement was the one that drew most of the attention—both positive and negative.”); CTR. FOR
CONST. LITIG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report_050914.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P6K9-LS6H] (noting that more than 2,300 comments were received in response to
the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendments); Email from Valerie M. Nannery, Senior
Litig. Couns., Ctr. for Const. Litig., to David G. Campbell, Chair, Civ. Rules Advisory Comm.
2 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/040914_Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SSUQ8ZK] (noting that most of the comments received were related to the discovery
amendments).
44. See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 3-4 (2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/civil-rules-public-hearing-transcript-phoenix-az.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6B55VSM] (testimony of William F. Hamilton, Quarles & Brady, LLP; Timothy A. Pratt, Fed’n
of Def. & Corp. Couns., Bos. Sci. Corp.; Professor Arthur Miller, N.Y.U. Sch. L.; David M.
Howard, Microsoft Corp.; Jocelyn D. Larkin, Impact Fund; and Paul V. Avelar, Inst. for Just.,
Ariz. Chapter).
45. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (“Some of the political and social
implications of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) are hard to miss. That statute,
after all, resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by interest groups
associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, following two
successful filibusters, fragile compromises.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Finally, the Supreme Court’s docket is peppered with procedural
cases.46 For example, the 2018-19 term saw three arbitration cases,47
and the 2019-20 term included two personal jurisdiction cases.48 The
previous decade has been marked by controversial procedure cases
ranging from personal jurisdiction to pleading to subject matter
jurisdiction.49
In sum, procedure matters, not just to the courts but to the
parties and their attorneys. When entering the civil justice system,
procedure is a key consideration, and one that impacts how the
parties and their lawyers evolve.
B. Political, Ideological & Attitudinal Inputs
Procedure is not the only input, however. Our civil justice system
is the product of other critical inputs as well. This Section is not an
exhaustive discussion of these inputs, but a highlight reel of how
procedure fits in this mosaic. Primarily, this Section will discuss
how politics, ideology, and attitudes affect our civil justice system.
Civil litigation was not a hot button issue when the 1938 rules
were adopted.50 To the contrary, civil litigation—while important—
took a back seat to other notable controversies and world events.51
It was not until the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s that the
public, and thus politicians, turned their attention to the civil
justice system and the courts’ role in enforcing norms.52 At the peak
46. See Dodson, supra note 35, at 713.
47. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Employers Prevail in Arbitration Case, SCOTUSBLOG
(May 21, 2018, 11:35 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/opinion-analysis-employersprevail-in-arbitration-case/ [https://perma.cc/8VMQ-3NQT].
48. Brett F. Clements & Elizabeth Runyan Geise, Supreme Court Will Address Personal
Jurisdiction After States Courts Interpret BMS Decision, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-will-address-personal-jurisdiction-afterstates-courts-interpret-bms [https://perma.cc/H9KC-55U9].
49. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 314-15 (2012).
50. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its
Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 277, 286 (2008).
51. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2004) (noting that New Deal reform was one such
controversy during the time).
52. Id. at 1983, 2000 (discussing the impact of Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil
Rights Movement on the culture of lawyers and the civil justice system).
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of the Civil Rights Movement, Congress began to pass an extraordinary array of laws aimed at achieving equality.53 Laws like the Civil
Rights Act,54 the Voting Rights Act,55 and the Fair Housing Act56
became significant vehicles for individuals who wanted to achieve
equality.57 The laws were, of course, enforced through the courts,
meaning that litigation perceptibly increased.58
Federal courts predicted an insurmountable surge in litigation by
the twenty-first century, and for good reason.59 Between 1960 and
1986, civil filings in federal court grew by almost 400 percent.60
With this future predicted, the battle lines were then drawn in a
way they had not been before. For those who believed in these laws,
litigation to enforce them seemed legitimate and necessary.61 To
those who questioned the need for these laws, this same litigation
appeared frivolous and abusive.62 The empirical evidence suggests
that frivolous litigation, while real in some cases, did not increase
in step with the increase in court filings.63 Yet, that nuance did not
matter so much once the issue was presented so starkly to the
American public and its political leaders.64
53. Constitutional Amendments and Major Civil Rights Acts of Congress Referenced in
Black Americans in Congress, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/
Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Constitutional-Amendments-andLegislation/ [https://perma.cc/J2MW-8S9W] (providing a list of laws enacted by Congress
during the Civil Rights Movement).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cf. Yeazell, supra note 51, at 2000.
58. See id. at 1983 (quoting ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN
SOCIAL CHANGE 5 (1982)).
59. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 4-5
(1986) (describing the excessive amount of litigation that occurs in America).
60. Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1178.
61. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 718 (1998).
62. Id. at 719 (“Starting in the 1970s, unease among elites about the expansion of law
joined with interest group concern to curtail liability and to promote campaigns deriding law
and lawyers. Such campaigning intensified in the mid-1980s with corporate spokesmen and
their political allies mournfully reciting the woes of a legal system in which Americans, egged
on by avaricious lawyers, sue too readily, and irresponsible juries and activist judges waylay
blameless businesses at enormous cost to social and economic well-being.”).
63. Id. at 740-47 (summarizing studies demonstrating that perception and media
portrayals of litigation abuse overstate such abuse).
64. See id. at 748.
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At the same time, with the rise of the middle class, more and
more Americans had access to lawyers and courts to resolve their
civil disputes.65 Muscular federal administrative agencies also
became more active in the courts.66 Businesses—large and small—
began to feel the stress of increased litigation.67 Lawyers became
more specialized and organized themselves along partisan lines.68
The “generalist” lawyer became a vestige of the past as groups like
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA, now American
Association for Justice) began to take the lead.69 Simultaneously,
business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce began to organize around pushing litigation reform that would benefit defendant
corporations.70 And many of the new rights established by Congress
provided for the payment of attorneys’ fees, something that immediately increased attorney engagement and public skepticism.71 The
stage was set for a battle that, while about the courts, would take
place far outside of them in the public square.
The 1970s through the 1990s ushered in a litigation tsunami of
sorts. Concerns of a litigation “hyperlexis”72 inspired policymakers
to restrict the number of “frivolous”73 cases making their way
through the federal court system.74 Groups like the Chamber of
65. See generally id. at 717-18 (discussing how shifts in American legal and social culture
provided access to the civil system to those previously excluded from it, including “injured
workers and consumers, blacks, [and] women”).
66. See Galanter, supra note 59, at 17-18.
67. See id. at 4.
68. See id. at 28.
69. ATLA was founded in 1946, but really took off in the 1950s. See About Us, AM. ASS’N
FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/5BM8-AHW4].
70. Galanter, supra note 61, at 749.
71. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396-97 (1982) (“Finally,
Congress has provided for the payment of attorneys’ fees to various classes of victorious
plaintiffs and has thereby created new incentives to litigate.”).
72. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 6 (1983).
73. Galanter, supra note 61, at 717.
74. There is scant evidence that such a hyperlexis occurred—in fact, empirical work done
in reflection on this time in our nation’s legal history reveals that the number of cases filed
was actually to be expected given our nation’s population and GDP. Galanter, supra note 72,
at 5 (“Data on the prevalence and processing of disputes and litigation are assembled and
analyzed. They show that only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; only
a small portion of these become lawsuits. Of those that do, the vast majority are abandoned,
settled or routinely processed without full-blown adjudication. Comparison of current with
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Commerce began to lobby against this perceived trend.75 Politicians
and the public followed.76 Gone were the days of the Atticus Finchtype lawyer and the idea of litigation as a vehicle for justice.
Instead, politicians began to deride the legal profession and the
litigation it spawned.77 Then-Vice President Dan Quayle, in a 1991
speech to the American Bar Association, posited that there were “too
many lawyers, too many lawsuits, and too many excessive damage
awards.”78 This problem within our civil justice system, according to
Quayle, made the United States less competitive in the global
marketplace and hurt our economy.79 Quayle provided no empirical
evidence for his statements, but that did not matter so much.80
Quayle was simply reflecting what had already become a common
trope about the civil justice system.81 That is, there were too many
lawyers taking on too many frivolous cases, and those lawyers and
cases were draining our economy.82
Whether Quayle was right or not, the public, including a number
of lawyers, believed him.83 This remains true today.84 Nearly 80
past litigation rates shows a recent rise, but present levels are not historically
unprecedented.”); Galanter, supra note 59, at 5 (“Per capita rates of filing civil cases have
risen in most localities during recent decades. Before these increases are taken as proof of
runaway litigiousness, it should be noted that these rates are not historically unprecedented.
Several studies document higher per capita rates of civil litigation in nineteenth and early
twentieth century America, as well as in colonial times.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, LAWSUITS IN A MARKET ECONOMY: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL LITIGATION
2-3 (2018) (arguing that, in the main, civil litigation is both driven by the market economy and
relatively efficient).
75. Galanter, supra note 61, at 749. Then-president of the United States Chamber of
Commerce admitted:
[T]he single, universal thing I get a positive response on—from small companies
and big companies, from individual proprietors and multinationals—is that
something has gone seriously wrong with our legal system, that we’ve become
a society where there always must be someone who’s wrong and there always
must be someone to sue.
Id.
76. Id. at 720.
77. Id. at 748.
78. David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/14/us/address-by-quayle-on-justiceproposals-irks-bar-association.html [https://perma.cc/VWG3-DQNZ].
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Score One for Dan Quayle: Too Many Lawyers, Suits, DESERET NEWS (July 21, 1992,
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percent of the public believes too many frivolous lawsuits are filed.85
Similarly, lobbying groups continue to aggressively pursue the narrative of frivolous litigation.86
The combination of politicians, the public, and lobbying groups
aiming their collective disdain at the civil justice system has had
consequences. As this Article will discuss, Congress and other policymakers have focused on curbing frivolous lawsuits through
procedural mechanisms. These attitudinal, ideological, and, in some
cases, political viewpoints permeate our citizenry, our politicians,
and our judiciary, making it easier to justify procedural reform. And
while hostility to litigation certainly manifests in ways beyond
procedural changes, procedure remains a primary catalyst for bias
against litigation.87

12:00 AM), https://www.deseret.com/1992/7/21/18995563/score-one-for-dan-quayle-too-manylawyers-suits [https://perma.cc/9WNE-767L] (referring to a California Lawyer poll, which
found that 76 percent of the lawyers who responded agreed with Quayle’s assessment).
84. Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449-50 (2004).
85. Id.
86. For example, in 2002, the American Tort Reform Foundation began releasing its
annual “Judicial Hellholes” report, which purports to document “various abuses within the
civil justice system, focusing primarily on jurisdictions where courts have been radically out
of balance.” Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., https://www.judicialhellholes.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/QWV6-YMPW]. For a taste of how this group reflects its ire, the state
of California regularly comes in at the top of the judicial hellhole list. Judicial Hellholes 20202021 Executive Summary, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., https://www.judicialhellholes.org/
reports/2020-2021-executive-summary/ [https://perma.cc/MJ8Z-B8TT]. The group claims that
the jurisdictions on which it focuses “systematically apply laws and court procedures in an
unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants in civil lawsuits.” Judicial
Hellholes, supra.
87. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006)
(“It also argues more cautiously for the proposition that—while a reinvigorated federalism,
an agenda-driven conservatism, and a constitutionally fixated judicial supremacy are all part
and parcel of the legacy of the Rehnquist Court—hostility to litigation has been, in the end,
the most historically significant and all-encompassing theme of the Rehnquist era.”); Lee
Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, When It Comes to Business, the Right and
Left Sides of the Court Agree, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 33 (2017) (“Because the current
Democratic and Republican appointees support business at record levels, the fraction of
unanimous pro-business decisions—the ‘Business Favorability Index’—has never been higher.
What with the left and right side of the bench favoring business at levels unprecedented in
the last 70 years, it is fair to continue to characterize the Roberts Court as ‘pro-business.’”).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURE
Modern procedure emerged in the late 1930s with the adoption of
a uniform set of procedural rules under the Rules Enabling Act.88
Codified in Rule 1’s “just, speedy, and inexpensive” language, the
rules exemplified the values that were to underpin the federal civil
justice system.89 Justice and efficiency were to be the foundation of
procedure within the federal courts.90 It is worth remembering,
however, that the new rules also presented an incredible environmental shift for attorneys and their clients at the time.91 Yet,
attorneys adapted and there was a semblance of equilibrium within
the federal court system for the next forty years.92
As discussed in the previous Part, however, starting in the 1960s,
Congress adopted an unprecedented set of substantive laws in areas
like antitrust, discrimination, and the like, resulting in more cases
being filed.93 As the number of cases filed in the federal and state
court systems increased, and as the perception of an outbreak of
frivolous litigation took hold, procedure became a critical focus for
policymakers.94
88. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 396.
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
90. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 396.
91. See id. at 396-97.
92. See id. at 397.
93. Id. at 396 (“Congress has created and the courts have articulated a multitude of new
rights and legally cognizable wrongs.”).
94. For example, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the
Supreme Court articulated its concern that additional substantive rights invite “bad” or
frivolous cases. 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013). The Court explained that it rejected lessening the
causation standard in the Title VII context because properly terminated employees would
take advantage. It reasoned:
Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that he or she is
about to be fired for poor performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just
transferred to a different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful action,
he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or
religious discrimination; then, when the unrelated employment action comes,
the employee could allege that it is retaliation. If respondent were to prevail in
his argument here, that claim could be established by a lessened causation
standard, all in order to prevent the undesired change in employment
circumstances. Even if the employer could escape judgment after trial, the
lessened causation standard would make it far more difficult to dismiss dubious
claims at the summary judgment stage.
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From that time to present day, federal court civil procedure has
markedly changed. The “restrictive ethos” of modern procedure is
well documented and punctuated by the most recent changes:
pleading requirements under Twombly and Iqbal and proportionality in discovery through the Rule 26 amendments.95 But the
restrictive trend began much earlier, in the 1980s.96 Starting in that
decade, the Supreme Court trumpeted summary judgment.97 The
rulemaking committees buttressed Rule 11 sanction rules and restricted discovery.98 Federal judges began to manage federal cases
instead of adjudicating them,99 and civil trial rates precipitously
decreased.100 In other words, the rules of the game changed, and
quite drastically.
As they always have, parties and their claims evolved. This Part
will chronicle and examine how, in response to procedural reforms,
litigants have adapted, migrated, and gone extinct. It will also highlight how the evolution of procedure has worked to endanger
particular claims more than others.

Id. See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017) (discussing this phenomenon of the Court’s obsession
with the idea that frivolous cases abound).
95. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
353, 359 (2010) (“The major counter-value within the restrictive ethos is a threshold skepticism that yields an interest in excluding or discouraging claims rather than supporting and
encouraging them.”).
96. Id. at 359-60.
97. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). For a critical commentary of these cases, see Jeffrey
W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99 (1988).
98. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on
the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 100-01 (1993) (discussing the evolution of Rule 11); Brooke D.
Coleman, Discovering Innovation: Discovery Reform and Federal Civil Rulemaking, 51 AKRON
L. REV. 765, 772-80 (2017) (summarizing the committee’s history of discovery reform).
99. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 376.
100. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 500-01 (2004) (documenting
the decrease in trial rates).
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A. Adaptation
When procedures change, parties and their attorneys must
respond. In order to survive and see another day in court, certain
parties and their attorneys have adapted within the civil ecosystem.
When one door closes, they find another open one. That is the case
with the development of multidistrict litigation where adaptive
parties and their attorneys found a way to aggregate claims even
when the stand-alone modern class action was on the decline. In
other cases, however, parties and their attorneys adapt not by
finding a different procedural opening; instead, they change the
rules of the ecosystem altogether. By influencing the civil rulemaking system, these parties and their attorneys have effectively
modified the rules of the entire civil litigation game.101 Discovery
reform is an example of this adaptive behavior.102
1. Multidistrict Litigation
The stand-alone modern class action has declined while multidistrict litigation has grown.103 Though, to simply say multidistrict
litigation, or MDL, has grown is an understatement— MDLs have
flourished.104 Currently, MDLs make up approximately 50 percent
of the federal docket.105 This uptick in multidistrict litigation is not
101. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 95, at 361-66.
102. See id. at 359-60.
103. Of course, the growth of class actions was also a prime example of procedural
evolution. The class action creature was created and used to fill a vacuum in the litigation
landscape. Whether that vacuum was what Dave Marcus has labeled a “regulatory” one or an
“adjectival” one remains debatable. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action,
Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 590 (2013). Either way, the
device was adopted to fill a void. See id. at 592-94 (“The regulatory conception treats Rule 23
as ‘an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government,’ to quote Warren Burger’s classic description.... The adjectival conception
begins with the premise that Rule 23, like any other joinder rule, serves classically procedural
goals.”).
104. Daniel Fisher, Multidistrict Litigation Swamps Courts as Rules Struggle to Catch Up;
Is Reform on the Way?, LEGAL NEWSLINE, (Mar. 21, 2019), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/
512312998-multidistrict-litigation-swamps-courts-as-rules-struggle-to-catch-up-is-reform-onthe-way [https://perma.cc/9CRW-4HWB].
105. Id. (“Cases consolidated into MDLs comprised 52 percent of civil lawsuits at the end
of 2018, according to Lawyers for Civil Justice, the highest level since multidistrict litigation
was created by federal statute 50 years ago.”).
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some fluke. Instead, it is the product of litigants evolving to a
changing procedural landscape—one that made the traditional class
action much harder to achieve and left the door open to using MDL
as an alternative device.106
Multidistrict litigation allows for the transfer of an infinite
number of related cases to one federal judge who can collectively
resolve all of the pretrial matters related to those actions.107 By
design, the multidistrict transferee judge is supposed to resolve all
of these pretrial matters and then remand the individual cases back
to their original courts for trial, but practice is quite different.108
Most multidistrict cases settle or are dismissed before the transferee
judge, with only 3 percent of cases going before their original court
for trial.109
The MDL statute was adopted in 1968, a mere two years after the
modern class action rule, Rule 23, came into being.110 While both
options provided an efficient way to aggregate claims, plaintiffs
initially chose Rule 23.111 Rule 23 enjoyed a good ride, but like other
rules within the civil litigation system, it came under increased
scrutiny in the early aughts.112 Scholars, politicians, and the public
had many concerns about class action lawsuits, including attorney
incentives and litigation abuse.113 These concerns were also
106. See id.
107. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 843-45 (2017) (providing a history of multidistrict
litigation).
108. See id.
109. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 72 (2017) (“[T]he reality is that just 2.9 percent of cases return to their original
districts.”); Douglas G. Smith, The Myth of Settlement in MDL Proceedings, 107 KY. L.J. 467,
474-76 (2019) (arguing that while only a small number of cases are remanded back for trial
in MDL, that does not mean that all the remaining cases settle—many are dismissed once the
court has done some sifting of the claims).
110. Bradt, supra note 107, at 838.
111. Id. at 844-45; see also Arthur R. Miller, The American Class Action: From Birth to
Maturity, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 8 (2018) (providing a history of the modern class
action).
112. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and
Legitimacy, 1981-1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789-90 (2018) (“[T]he class action’s second
era fueled the tumult of its third. According to one prominent theory, a particular policy
changes disjointedly, with periods of quiet stability punctuated by abrupt dislocations.”).
113. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of
Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 856 (1995); Marcus, supra note 112, at 1828-29 (“A New
York Times op-ed in 1985 castigated ‘[c]lass-action shakedowns,’ citing litigation against ‘the
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expressed in the courts.114 Federal judges were skeptical of certifying classes, and their decisions began to constrain the reach of the
modern class action rule.115 In addition, Congress passed legislation
to limit the viability of class actions in state court.116 The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 effectively pulled a number of state-filed
class actions into federal court where a harsher judicial eye would
be cast on the certification question.117 There are very few studies of
the decline in class actions, but most scholars agree that the Rule 23
class action is a wounded aggregation device.118
The fact that Rule 23 class actions are less common does not
mean that the systemic demand for the aggregation of claims has
waned. To the contrary, if litigants and attorneys desire a comprehensive resolution of claims—or as one commentator put it, “[n]ational litigation,”—they have to find another way.119 Some adaptive
litigants have found their answer in multidistrict litigation.
Yet, there are some meaningful differences between class actions
and MDLs.120 Some MDLs consolidate class actions that a transferee
morning sickness drug Bendectin’ as an example, despite the fact that Bendectin’s manufacturer had actually filed the class-certification motion. A prominent pundit complained that
the Breast Implants class action had ‘bludgeoned’ Dow Corning ‘into throwing $2 billion into
a “global” settlement[ ] that destroyed the company,’ apparently oblivious to the fact that Dow
Corning had pursued a class action settlement to avoid bankruptcy.” (footnotes omitted)).
114. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569,
1612 (2016) (“[S]tarting in the mid-1990s, many federal judges began to take a skeptical view
of class actions.”).
115. Id.
116. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1511.
117. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715); see also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1511 (describing the
history and adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act).
118. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (stating that “class actions will
soon be virtually extinct”); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 423 (2014).
119. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2017);
Bradt, supra note 107, at 833 (“With the Supreme Court and lower courts cutting back the
viability of the class action under Rule 23 for decades and with Congress providing for
expanded jurisdiction over class actions in the federal courts, MDL has become the leading
mechanism for resolving mass torts.”).
120. Some class actions are certified within an MDL. When they are not, there are no Rule
23 protections. Burch, supra note 109, at 71 (explaining that attorneys, appellate courts,
and—in some cases—defendants protect classes to some degree, “[b]ut even these safeguards
crumble in non-class, multidistrict proceedings”). While some MDL judges still apply class-
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judge must then resolve, but a number of MDLs do not implicate the
class action rule or include only a few class actions within the mix
of aggregated cases.121 This means that many of the due process
protections that had been built into Rule 23 often do not apply in
the MDL context.122 There is no Rule 23(a)(4) requirement to assess
adequacy of representation, no Rule 23(g) appointment of counsel,
and no Rule 23(e) fairness assessment for a proposed settlement.123
For this reason, MDLs have been described by some as the “Wild
West” of aggregate litigation—a place where the rules are not defined and where those with the biggest guns survive.124
This raises the question of which litigants choose MDLs. Stated
differently, which litigants are able to adapt and fit themselves into
this alternative aggregation device? At first, innovative defendants
looked to be the winners.125 They could use the device to achieve the
benefits of aggregation (like some form of a global settlement) without some of the headaches of the class action (the plaintiffs’ control
over who was certified into the class, for example).126 That trend no
longer appears to apply.127 Instead, innovative plaintiffs and defendants are putting the device to good use in what appears to be fairly
equal measure.128 This narrative cuts against the traditional plaintiffs’ bar versus defense bar tropes.129 MDL, it turns out, is a great
action-like protections, they are not required to do so. Gluck, supra note 119, at 1692 (“Some
academics have been critical of these borrowed tools, especially where judges pick and choose
among safeguards without including the full protections of the class action or other procedure.”).
121. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
71, 78-79 (2015).
122. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1273, 1294 (2012) (“Class actions contain built-in protections that help to guard
against collusion .... Nonclass aggregation, on the other hand, lacks these safeguards.”).
123. See id.
124. See Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict
Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111
(2015) (observing that “MDL involves something of a cross between the Wild West, twentiethcentury political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies”).
125. See Burch, supra note 121, at 78-79.
126. See, e.g., id.
127. See Fisher, supra note 104.
128. Cf. Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Preferences in Multidistrict
Litigation, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1713, 1715-18 (2019).
129. There is now a movement by the defense bar to put some restrictions on MDL that
might hamper plaintiffs’ abilities to succeed. See id. at 1715 (“[T]he movement to ‘reform’
MDL [is] spearheaded by the corporate-defense bar.”). Rules4MDLs is just one example.
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equalizer in this respect.130 That does not mean that all litigants and
attorneys benefit, however. As I have argued elsewhere, the great
benefactors of MDL are elite lawyers and, at least with respect to
corporate defendants and powerful plaintiffs, their clients.131
A study by Elizabeth Chamblee Burch revealed that MDLs are a
bastion for repeat player attorneys and their law firms—on both
sides of the “v.”132 These elite attorneys frequent the MDL device in
staggering numbers.133 This has led many commentators to question
whether there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent attorneys from sacrificing their clients’ best interests for their own.134
The key takeaway with respect to MDLs is that it demonstrates
how the most-resourced attorneys and clients find optimal ways to
resolve their grievances. When one device—the class action—was
effectively no longer available, the litigants and attorneys who still
wanted the benefit of some form of aggregation adapted into
multidistrict litigation.135 When those attorneys and clients did so,
attorneys and clients who might have benefitted from a class action
lost out. For example, the first client and attorney to file a claim
often now find themselves swept up, or perhaps left behind, when
their case is consolidated into an MDL.136 Those who had the

About, RULES4MDLS, https://www.rules4mdls.com/ [https://perma.cc/XQL9-9JNH]. But other
than that, the device is largely seen as presenting an equal opportunity for both plaintiffs and
defendants.
130. See Clopton & Bradt, supra note 128, at 1715-18.
131. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1036 (2016).
132. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1453-54 (2017) (“Much of the
literature surrounding repeat players contemplates litigants as the repeat players—Walmart,
Merck, or Johnson & Johnson. And it is true that major corporate defendants are repeat
actors in multidistrict litigation. But they are not the only ones. Many plaintiffs’ and defense
attorneys are repeat players, too.” (footnote omitted)).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1454-55.
135. See Bradt, supra note 107, at 843-45.
136. See Burch, supra note 121, at 96. In many cases, the attorneys that file the smaller
cases swept up in an MDL are not placed on the powerful leadership committees that run and
have the most to benefit from the MDL. Id. (“Although only 31% of individual attorneys
involved in multidistrict litigation were named to one or more leadership positions, the total
number of positions this small group occupied is more revealing: repeat players held 749 out
of 1177 available leadership positions, or 63.6%. Fifty attorneys were named as lead lawyers
in five or more multidistrict litigations and claimed 30% of all leadership roles.”).
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resources to adapt moved on, leaving those who could not adapt in
the dust.
That is not to say MDLs do not provide relief for individuals that
might not have otherwise been able to achieve relief. Like the modern class action, aggregation within MDLs allows for parties to
recover together in ways that they might not have individually.137
The difference is that MDLs have shown themselves to be an exclusive club for attorneys.138 Further, there are far fewer protections in
MDL for marginalized parties.139 Thus, while some of the most
resource-rich parties and attorneys have been able to adapt into
MDL in a way that is beneficial, those without such resources have
not.
2. Discovery Reform
MDL is an example of an adaptation that occurred within the
court system. Powerful parties used a tool already at their disposal—the MDL statute—to good effect.140 But adaptations also
occur outside the court ecosystem. There, parties can use processes
tangential to the civil justice system, but outside the actual courts,
to create new advantages useful within the courts.141 One example
is how parties have advocated within the civil rulemaking process
for changes to discovery rules.
The civil rulemaking process is predominantly conducted through
committees comprised of judges, lawyers, and academics who are
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court.142 The committees’ work is not per se political, but because it
is open to the public, it is susceptible to lobbying efforts by powerful
litigants.143 By adapting, these litigants have figured out how to
maximally affect how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
specifically the discovery rules, develop.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Burch & Williams, supra note 132, at 1458.
See id.
See supra note 123.
See Burch & Williams, supra note 132, at 1453-54.
See Gluck, supra note 119, at 1690-91.
See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1015-17.
See id. at 1023.
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The discovery rules of 1938 were a sea change for parties and
attorneys in federal court. Previously, the parties were left to their
own devices in tracking down evidence and moving their case
forward, but the 1938 rules completely upended that system.144 The
new rules provided for a fairly open exchange of information
between the parties.145 At first, and for many decades, the parties
and their lawyers were able to manage discovery on their own
without much input from judges.146 Judith Resnik referred to the
period from 1938 until the early 1960s as a “‘honeymoon’ of sorts”
for judges and litigants as “[b]oth groups gradually learned how to
use the new rules.”147
With the perception of a crisis within the judicial system, however, came the perception that discovery might be one major source
of the problem.148 Adapting to the environment around them, parties
and their attorneys set their sights on discovery reform.149 A
sustained campaign that began in the early 1980s and continues to
this day has had a substantial impact on discovery rules.150 The
litigants that adapted to this reality—the power that the rulemaking process has over how the rules develop—are the litigants that
have gained the most.
Rule 26 of the 1938 discovery rules altered the status quo by
allowing for discovery of all relevant information related to the
subject matter of the litigation. The new discovery regime reflected
the committee’s commitment to a litigation system that would
encourage the free exchange of information.151 Under the new civil
144. See Dodson, supra note 35, at 708.
145. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 397.
146. See id. at 377-78.
147. Id. at 397. As Resnik observed in her seminal 1982 article Managerial Judges, reformers pushed a solution that would require judges to take on a larger administrative role.
Id. at 377-78. Much of this managerial role manifested in how the judge and the litigants
engaged over discovery. Id. at 378-79. Resnik’s article focused on how the judiciary’s role in
litigation was impacted by this shift. Id. at 379-80. Less examined is how the litigants themselves adapted over time.
148. Id. at 397.
149. See id. at 395-96.
150. See Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579, 585-86; Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM.
BAR ASS’N FOUND. RSCH. J. 217, 219-22.
151. The Advisory Committee note to the original Rule 26 explained, “[w]hile the old
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rules, each party could obtain the information it needed as long as
the information was relevant and not privileged.152 As stated earlier,
litigants adapted quite well to this change, and there was a
semblance of equilibrium for some time.153
While the grumblings of discovery reform emerged in the 1960s,154
concerted efforts to change the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
really took hold in the 1980s.155 In 1983, the committee responded
to what it called “over-discovery” by amending Rule 26(b)(1).156 The
revised rule articulated the first version of our current “proportionality” language by requiring a judge to, in appropriate cases, weigh
the costs and benefits of the discovery in question.157 The committee
expressed concern that judges had “been reluctant to limit the use
of the discovery devices” in the past.158 This rule change did not
come out of thin air; to the contrary, the rule’s origin had much to
do with the American Bar Association Section of Litigation.159 In the
late 1970s, that section commissioned a Report of the Special
chancery practice limited discovery to facts supporting the case of the party seeking it, this
limitation has been largely abandoned by modern legislation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee’s note to 1937 amendment. In addition, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 1946 to
clarify that parties could use discovery to seek out inadmissible evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. The Advisory Committee note stated,
“[t]he purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any
other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case.” Id.
152. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 378-79 (describing the culture of the discovery system
during this era as “give your opponent all information relevant to the litigation”). In 1970, the
committee codified work product protection, or trial preparation material protection, to bring
the rules in line with the Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment; see 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
153. See Resnik, supra note 71, at 396-97.
154. See Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942 (1961).
155. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1784-85 (2015).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1983) (stating in part that a judge must assess whether “the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation”).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. This new rule
language, the Committee hoped, would “guard against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed
to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.” Id.
159. ADVISORY COMM. CIV. R., MINUTES OF THE DECEMBER 12-13, 1977 MEETING 13-15
(1977) (statement of Paul R. Connolly, former Chairman of the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV12-1977-min.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SH7E-ER87].
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Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, which was distributed
to the bench and bar and became the jumping off point for the
committee’s work.160 While the special committee was comprised of
an array of attorneys, it was mostly skewed in a corporate defensecentric way.161 Even still, the ABA did not profess a particular viewpoint or ideology, and in that way, the proposals were not directly
motivated by particular client interests.162
The 1983 amendments to Rule 26 did not stem the tide of criticism aimed at discovery.163 Thus, in 1993, Rule 26 was once again
amended, primarily to require Rule 26(a)(1)’s mandatory initial
disclosures.164 Under that rule, the parties were now required to
disclose certain documents, witnesses, and damage computation
information.165

160. Id. at 13; see also SECTION LITIG. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECOND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, 92 F.R.D. 137 (1980); Weyman I. Lundquist,
In Search of Discovery Reform, 66 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 1071, 1071-73 (1980).
161. The special committee was chaired by Joseph Ball, a renowned trial lawyer who
represented clients such as Watergate’s John D. Erlichman, Saudi Arabian arms dealer,
Adnan Khashoggi, and a senior partner at Heller Erhman, Weyman I. Lundquist. See Elaine
Woo, Attorney Joseph A. Ball Dies; Played Key Warren Commission Role, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
23, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-sep-23-me-25521-story.
html [https://perma.cc/8SH3-T6K6]; Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39
B.C. L. REV. 747, 754 n.35, 762 n.83 (1998).
162. See generally SECTION LITIG. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 160.
163. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through
Local Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 769 (1985).
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). Rule 11 was simultaneously amended. See FED. R. CIV. P.
11(b)-(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The 1993 version of Rule 11—the
version still in place today—provided that sanctions were discretionary and meant to serve
a deterrent, not punitive, purpose. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). In addition, the revised Rule
11 provided for a 21-day safe harbor in which a litigant could pull an offending paper without
consequence. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). This rule change was exceedingly controversial. Paul D.
Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D.
295, 295 (1994) (“The 1993 revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evoked more
vigorous opposition than any rule revision ever promulgated by the Supreme Court of the
United States, save the single exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Much, but by no
means all, of the criticism has been directed at ... Rule 26(a)(1).”).
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The factors
adopted in 1983 were also now split from Rule 26(b)(1) into new Rule 26(b)(2). See FED. R.
CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
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The disagreement over this rule change came from all sides.166
Defense lawyers worried that required disclosure of this information
was antithetical to civil litigation’s adversarial ethos. That opposition was led by a powerful player in the rulemaking process, Alfred
Cortese, Jr., a partner at Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, who frequented rulemaking meetings and functioned as a representative of
the American Tort Reform Association.167 This episode marked the
beginning of direct lobbying efforts within the rulemaking system.168
Following the 1993 amendments, many criticized rulemakers’
lack of reliance on adequate empirical evidence.169 The rulemaking
committee, after engaging in a self-study, committed to requesting
and using more empirical work before engaging in rule reform.170
The committee’s first test was with discovery where it formed a subcommittee to examine the subject in greater detail.171 Committee
members sought out empirical research to determine how the
mandatory initial disclosure rule worked in practice.172 Both the
Federal Judicial Center and the RAND Corporation produced
studies.173 In addition, the committee held conferences in major
cities where it could interact with members of the bar, judges, and
the academy over potential rule proposals.174

166. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 549 (2001).
167. Id. at 564 n.202.
168. See, e.g., id. at 565-69. To be fair, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers disliked the rule as well,
worrying that it only required production for issues pleaded with particularity, language that
could be gamed to decrease actual disclosure. See id. at 563-64. To mitigate the overall
controversy, the new rule explicitly allowed for a district court to “opt out” of the rule. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment. See generally Stempel,
supra note 166, at 554-55 n.141 (discussing how many districts opted out of the federal rules
in favor of their own).
169. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 845 (1993) (“Again, there was little relevant empirical
evidence.”).
170. A SELF STUDY OF FEDERAL RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
LONG RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 168 F.R.D. 679, 699 (1995).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 711.
173. See Stempel, supra note 166, at 555.
174. See id.
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Yet the use of empirical evidence opened the committee up to a
different kind of outside influence.175 For example, in the 2000
amendments, the mandatory disclosure provision was limited to
claims or defenses made by the disclosing party.176 The limitation
meant that information that might have been helpful to the other
side did not have to be automatically disclosed.177 At least one
scholar worried that the committee had succumbed to effective
lobbying by powerful attorney groups—groups that could afford to
closely follow rulemaking efforts and could also afford to fund
studies that were beneficial to their position.178 Jeff Stempel, a
commentator, argued that “the empirical data available suggested
that the current broad scope of discovery was not viewed as a
problem by lawyers.”179 More specifically, Stempel pointed out that
“[a] fair reading of the FJC and RAND studies [did] not suggest that
the current ‘subject matter’ scope of discovery [was] a particular
problem.”180 In other words, the committee used the empirical evidence pushed on them by outside groups. Consequently, it minimized empirical evidence from neutral groups like RAND and the
Federal Judicial Center that was contrary to the narrative pushed
by litigants most interested in a narrow disclosure rule.181
Throughout the early 2000s, the perception that the civil justice
system was in crisis and that discovery was a major cause of this
discord persisted.182 In 2010, the committee convened the Duke

175. See id. at 571, 578, 618 (“In short, the Advisory Committee vote on scope of discovery,
despite a debate of considerable sophistication, in the end resembled Capitol Hill as much as
a judicial deliberation.”).
176. See id. at 552. This change mirrored changes to the scope of discovery under Rule
26(b)(1), which was also modified to only include a party’s claim or defense, allowing the party
to expand its inquiry to the subject matter of the claim upon a showing of good cause. The
Committee note explained that “[c]oncerns about costs and delay of discovery have persisted”
in spite of previous revisions to the discovery provisions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
177. See Stempel, supra note 166, at 569-70.
178. See id. at 613-14, 616-17.
179. Id. at 571.
180. Id. at 578.
181. See id. at 613-14.
182. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2012) (noting that even during the adoption of the 2000 discovery amendments, where there was evidence that “[d]iscovery seems to
be working quite well in general[,]” the amendments passed because “[t]he view that discovery
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Conference on Civil Litigation.183 The conference provided a forum
for debate about civil litigation, especially discovery, but it also
provided an opportunity for the committee and other attendees to
produce volumes of empirical research.184 This research reinforced
the chasm between reality and perception in civil litigation. For
example, one Federal Judicial Center study found that the median
discovery costs for plaintiffs amounted to $15,000 and the median
costs for defendants amounted to $20,000.185 A related study determined that higher discovery costs are meaningfully associated
with cases where the parties have more at stake.186 In contrast, an
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
(IAALS) survey of corporate legal counsel found that counsel believed that discovery costs in federal court were not proportional to
the value of the case 90 percent of the time.187
These two sets of studies presented polar views, but they were
also qualitatively completely different kinds of studies. The Federal
Judicial Center study relied on an actual accounting of cases—what
amount of money was spent in a set of standard federal cases and
what accounted for a precipitous increase in discovery costs in the
out-of-norm case.188 The IAALS study relied on the perception of
was ‘out of control’ was once again assumed without any effort to examine whether that was
true”).
183. 2010 Civil Litigation Conference Purpose Statement, U.S. CTS., https://www.
uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rulescommittees/2010-civil [https://perma.cc/JZ48-ME8Y].
184. See id.
185. EMERY G. LEE & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA8Y-MXEH].
186. EMERY G. LEE & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL
CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS—REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES 5, 7 (2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
CostCiv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ QS36-JHB8]. The study found that for both plaintiffs and
defendants, a 1 percent increase in stakes was associated with a 0.25 percent increase in total
discovery costs. Id. at 5.
187. DUKE CONF. SUBCOMM., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, REPORT OF THE DUKE
CONFERENCE SUBCOMMITTEE 79, 83 (2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_
import/CV2014-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/39WN-M9WA] [hereinafter DUKE REPORT]. Another
study by the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery found that almost
half of the respondents “believed that discovery is abused in almost every case, with responses
being essentially the same for both plaintiff and defense lawyers.” Id.
188. See id.
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corporate legal counsel; a perception that was valid, but should have
been skeptically considered by the committee because it was just
that—a perception.189
Nevertheless, the opinions of powerful groups like the corporate
general counsel represented in the IAALS study persuaded the
rulemakers.190 And in 2015, another set of controversial discovery
rules went into effect.191 The most notable of those rules was revised
Rule 26(b)(1), which was amended to include proportionality within
the definition of the scope of discovery.192 This new proportionality
rule was extraordinarily controversial, largely because many believed that it would solely benefit defendants.193 And, indeed, repeatplayer defendants had consistently pushed the rule and successfully
brought it to fruition.194 The original proposals for a proportionality
rule emerged from the advocacy at the Duke Civil Litigation
Conference.195 Moreover, the support for the rule through the rulemaking comment and testimony stage came from large corporate
general counsel, groups aligned with the Chamber of Commerce,
and big-law law firms.196 These groups heavily influenced the development of proportionality and will no doubt continue to exercise
that influence going forward.197
What the discovery reform story demonstrates is that, over time,
particular litigants and their attorneys determined that they could
impact the civil rules themselves by influencing the civil rulemaking
process. They stand to benefit from modern changes to discovery
189. See Coleman, supra note 98, at 778-79. For a discussion of how social science explains
why these study outcomes differed, see Reda, supra note 182, at 1107-08.
190. See DUKE REPORT, supra note 187, at 83; Coleman, supra note 131, at 1060-61.
191. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1022.
192. See id. at 1023. Five of these factors were taken directly from then-Rule 26(b)(2)(C),
which was a section of the discovery rules that explicitly granted the court power to limit
discovery. Those factors—whether the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit,” “the amount in controversy,” “the parties’ resources,” “the importance of the
issues at stake,” and the “importance of discovery in resolving the issues”—were joined by one
additional factor: “the parties’ relative access to relevant information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
193. For a broader discussion of the controversy, see Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The
Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the ProDefendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (2015).
194. See Suja A. Thomas, Via Duke, Companies are Shaping Discovery, LAW360 (Nov. 4,
2015, 2:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/723092/ [https://perma.cc/BS47-5EUH].
195. See id.
196. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 193, at 1140-41.
197. See id.
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rules, and that is no accident. From rule proposals to lobbying,
powerful litigants have ensured that their voices are heard and that
reforms beneficial to them are adopted. These adaptive parties and
attorneys, by working outside the court system, have effectively
influenced the rules that apply inside the courts.198
B. Migration
Adaptation is not the only evolutionary process though. When
litigants believe a forum and its rules are too cumbersome, those
litigants might migrate to another forum.199 For example, despite
the steady stream of restrictive procedural changes within the
federal courts, some policymakers and litigants were—and still
are—dissatisfied.200 In response, these attorneys and their clients
have migrated to different ecosystems with the full support—and
sometimes the hastening—of policymakers like the Court and
Congress.201

198. These same business interests have achieved the same by working through the
Chamber of Commerce to influence the Supreme Court and its jurisprudence. See Joanna C.
Schwartz, The Cost of Saving Business, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2016) (exploring the
connection between the arguments made in Chamber of Commerce amici filings and the
Supreme Courts mirror-image description of litigation in its decisions).
199. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415 (2009);
see also David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the
Future of Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1001, 1061 (2021) (“[B]y and large, American
courts accept forum shopping as an intrinsic part of the system. An obvious exception, of
course, is the Erie doctrine, which is explicitly structured around curtailing law-based
incentives for forum-shopping as between federal and state courts. But beyond Erie, and
despite occasional judicial outbursts noting ‘the danger of forum shopping’ or declaring it ‘evil,’
the underlying doctrinal story, from the Supreme Court on down, is a far more accommodating one.” (footnotes omitted)).
200. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 23.
201. See id.; see also Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better
Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1530 (2005)
(“Three points about forum shopping are worth emphasizing. First, every lawyer does it, or
at least contemplates doing it, in every case: it would be malpractice not to try to gain every
advantage for your client that the law permits. Second, perceptions about whether federal or
state courts are better for plaintiffs or defendants change over time as circumstances in the
different court systems change. Third, whatever limitations are imposed on forum shopping
must come from those who make the rules (either the judicial or legislative branches) because
lawyers will never restrain themselves for the good of the system, but will (and should) put
the interests of their clients first.”).
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Just as with adaptation, both plaintiffs and defendants have
migrated. They have not chosen the same fora, but at least in some
cases, they have both willingly fled the federal civil courts.202 For
example, defendants have migrated to arbitration while plaintiffs
have migrated to state courts and federal agencies.203
Forum shopping is a tactic that is at once maligned and common.
There is the forum shopping that the system accepts—good strategic
forum shopping that is within the system’s ethical guardrails.204 And
there is the unethical forum shopping that the system attempts to
dissuade, and when it can, prohibit.205
Litigants began pushing the bounds of forum shopping during the
heyday of expansive personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, using a generous view of minimum contacts under International Shoe v. State
of Washington, filed cases in places where a national or multinational company might have rather thin contacts, but where the
plaintiff perceived an advantage.206 With World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, the Court began to fracture over how expansively
to read a state’s power to bring a defendant into its borders.207 In
that case, the Court drew a new line in the sand.208 The national car
manufacturer might be subject to personal jurisdiction for its
defective car’s damage in Oklahoma, but the northeast regional car
distributor and New York state dealership certainly could not be.209
How finely to read such a distinction came before the Court again
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, but
there the Court’s division was stark.210 Four justices would find
personal jurisdiction only if the component part manufacturer had
done “something more” in California,211 while four other justices
202. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415.
203. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 274-75
(2015); cf. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 193, at 1085-87.
204. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415 (explaining that the civil justice system tolerates some
kinds of forum shopping).
205. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“The ‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”).
206. See 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
207. 444 U.S. 286, 318-19 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 291 (majority opinion).
209. Id. at 299.
210. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
211. Id. at 111-12.
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would have only required the manufacturer to have knowledge of its
part reaching the state.212
The Court’s decades-long personal jurisdiction fissures have left
lower courts, commentators, and litigants without a clear personal
jurisdiction test. Amid this uncertainty, some litigants began to take
a different tack; they determined in advance in which forum the
would-be litigants would be willing to litigate, and with that move,
the contractual forum-selection clause was born.213 At first, when
entering into such clauses, parties would negotiate at arms’ length
to determine their litigation forum.214 With the success of those
clauses, however, enterprising litigants began to insert these same
clauses into contracts that were not negotiated.215 Consumer contracts—almost always contracts of adhesion—began to include
language dictating the forum for any potential litigation.216 And, at
the height of the confusion over the scope of personal jurisdiction,
the Court notably blessed these forum selection clauses in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.217
In other words, the Court washed its hands of the uncertainty its
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence created and instead gave powerful litigants a new tool. Well-resourced potential litigants could
now dictate—through contract—which federal or state court in
212. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
213. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-92 (1991). Before then,
courts were generally not in favor of such clauses. Christine P. Bartholomew, James A.
Wooten, The Venue Shuffle: Forum Selection Clauses and ERISA, 66 UCLA L. REV. 862, 870
(2019) (“Through the first six decades of the twentieth century, courts in the United States
were generally skeptical of or even hostile to forum selection clauses.”).
214. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 591-93; Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract
Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1295 (2019) (“[T]he Court identified forum selection provisions as
a potent tool for informed parties in transactions involving ‘arm's-length negotiation by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen.’” (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972))).
215. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 596.
216. See id. at 590.
217. Id. at 595; see Kastner & Lieb, supra note 214, at 1294 (“The history of the doctrinal
acceptance of forum selection offers one more example of the phenomenon of creep from
similarly situated negotiating parties to general contract law.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Another
Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 360-61 (1992) (“When the Carnival Cruise Lines majority
opinion is coupled with the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., it is clear what prudent counsel ought to advise any prospective defendant,
especially any business enterprise: draft a fine-print, obscure combined choice-of-forum,
choice-of-law clause.” (footnote omitted)).
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which they wished to litigate. They could migrate a large portion of
the litigation against them into one chosen—and presumably
beneficial—location. The Court, to the surprise of many commentators, went along with this innovation, arguing that it provided
certainty and efficiency for all litigants.218 Moreover, the Court
stressed that despite the nature of contracts of adhesion, the
potential litigants had consented to these fora.219
Yet even when parties—mostly defendants—now had the power
to dictate ahead of time which federal or state court they would
litigate in, many defendants were still frustrated with traditional
courts and wanted to migrate.220 But this time, they did not just
want to migrate to a pre-chosen state or federal court; they wanted
to migrate out of the court system altogether.221
Defendants had long advocated for alternatives to what they
viewed as an expensive and wasteful federal civil court system.222
These litigants initially sought relief within the federal court system
by lobbying local courts to adopt robust alternative dispute resolution referral systems.223 In these systems, judges routinely referred

218. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593-94 (“Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante
the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about
where suits arising from the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the
time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial
resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions.”); John F. Coyle,
Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1793 (2019) (“Forum selection
clauses ... are now regularly written into commercial contracts in the United States. Although
U.S. courts were historically reluctant to enforce such clauses, this is no longer the case.
Modern courts will generally give effect to these provisions so long as they are not unjust,
contrary to public policy, or the product of fraud or overreaching.” (footnotes omitted)).
219. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593 (“As an initial matter, we do not adopt the
Court of Appeals’ determination that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket
contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.”).
220. See Leslie, supra note 203, at 270-71.
221. See id.
222. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 233, 244 (2008) (“[C]ourts and legislatures perceived arbitration as a renegade, even
bastardized form of adjudication.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration
Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 117 (“The individuals who were
involved had passionate, sincere beliefs about the use of arbitration to resolve commercial
disputes.”). Charles Bernheimer “devoted almost decades of his life and his personal finances
to lobbying for arbitration laws, as well as advocating for the use of arbitration.” Id. at 138.
223. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2840 (2015).
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cases to mediation or arbitration early in the process.224 More
recently though, defendants have completely circumvented federal
courts by requiring arbitration in their standard form contracts.225
And federal courts have cheerfully supported this migration, upholding forced arbitration clauses along with clauses that prohibit
the filing of aggregate claims in arbitration.226 The Court initially
blessed forced arbitration clauses in a federal securities fraud case
in 1985.227 From that point on, the Supreme Court’s initial posture
of limiting arbitration to disputes between merchants has expanded
exponentially.228
Many commentators were shocked not just by the Court’s willingness to read the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) so broadly, but also
by its willingness to accept that parties could contract into these
provisions even when one party really did not have the power to
negotiate its terms.229 In Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, the Court reasoned that “[c]onsent is essential under the FAA because arbitrators
wield only the authority they are given.”230 According to the Court,
“[p]arties may generally shape such agreements to their liking by
specifying with whom they will arbitrate, the issues subject to
arbitration, [and] the rules by which they will arbitrate.”231 In
Varela, the employee signed an employment agreement with his
224. Id. (“Beginning in the 1970s, the flexibility and informality of various forms of ADR
(not only arbitration) came to be praised as virtues—juxtaposed against the formal and public
obligations of adjudication which were, in turn, gaining the negative valence of imposing
undue costs on both disputants and the courts. Congress enacted statutes and agencies
promulgated regulations commending arbitration, mediation, and other ADR methods for use
by administrative agencies and in the federal courts.”). To a large extent, this trend continues
today. Karen Wells Roby, Ethics in Settlement: The Effect of Material Misrepresentation, 59
FED. LAW. 42, 42 (2012) (“In federal courts across the United States, it is common for litigants
and their counsel to be required to participate in either private mediation or court-ordered
mediation before a U.S. magistrate judge.”).
225. See Leslie, supra note 203, at 270-71.
226. See id. at 275-77.
227. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215, 223-24 (1985).
228. Leslie, supra note 203, at 273 (“After decades of holding that arbitration clauses did
not apply to federal statutory claims, the Supreme Court changed course in the 1980s.”).
229. See Gilles, supra note 118, at 395 (“In sum, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence over the past thirty years has evinced an incredibly expansive view of the FAA. And
while the full import of this national policy favoring arbitration has been criticized by many,
including members of the Court itself, there is no reason to believe the Court will swing back
to a more nuanced interpretation of the FAA.” (footnotes omitted)).
230. 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).
231. Id.
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employer, Lamps Plus, that included the forced individual arbitration provision.232 The idea that he actually “consented” to that
provision is untenable; yet the Court relied on that reasoning.233
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that these types of provisions—like the forum selection clauses that came before them—are
voluntary and consensual.234
Powerful parties continue to push for even bigger advantages.
Once the forced arbitration clause was solidified, enterprising plaintiffs began to adapt. If a case had to be resolved in arbitration,
plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to resolve those disputes by aggregating multiple claims within arbitration.235 This move ostensibly
increased defendants’ risk because appellate review of arbitration
decisions is so limited.236 To mitigate this potential downside for
defendants—the chance that a big-dollar arbitration loss would
have limited appellate review—enterprising defendants began to
include class action waivers in their forced arbitration clauses.237
This adaptation made it far less likely that anyone would arbitrate
small-dollar cases at all.238 And, again, the Court blessed these
clauses—and repeatedly so.239 Starting with AT&T Mobility LLC
232. Id. at 1413.
233. Id. at 1416-19.
234. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 662-63 (1996).
235. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a PostClass Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 454 (2014) (noting that, for example, Consumers
Count attempts to “help multiple consumers bring claims against companies without resort[ing] to class actions ... once a ‘critical mass’ of consumers have complained about the
same practice, Consumers Count will ‘spring into action’ and refer the complaints to a law
firm which can then enter into fee agreements with the multiple consumers and attempt to
pursue their claims ... in arbitration”).
236. Brian T. McCartney, Rethinking Appeal of Arbitrability Decisions: When to Review
“That Which Long Process Could Not Arbitrate”, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 229, 229 (“[T]he court
of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the issue of arbitrability until the arbitrator’s final
decision had been confirmed or vacated by the district court .... [O]nce an affirmative
determination of arbitrability has been made, judicial involvement in the arbitration process
is minimized.”).
237. See Gilles, supra note 118, at 398-99 (discussing the collusive efforts by business
interests to adopt class action waivers in arbitration).
238. Id. at 396 (“Indeed, by the early 1990s an ADR cottage industry was in full bloom,
fueled not by people interested in ‘alternative dispute resolution’—a sunny moniker reflecting
the earnest, academic roots of the movement in the 1960s—but by corporations seeking ways
to decrease their liability risks.” (footnote omitted)).
239. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
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v. Concepcion, the Court articulated its bleak vision of the federal
civil justice system broadly and class actions more specifically.240
Arguing that permitting class relief within arbitration would thwart
the efficiency gains of that system, the Court held that class action
waivers—again, even when found in contracts of adhesion—were
permitted.241
The impact has been layered. First, the number of claims that can
be filed in court profoundly decreased because these provisions
proliferated.242 Second, when these cases do go to arbitration,
defendants overwhelmingly win.243 A study by The Economic Policy
Institute estimates that “workers subject to mandatory arbitration
win just 38 percent as often as they would in state court and 59
percent as often as they would in federal court.”244 And finally, while
the number of contracts with this language might have resulted in
an arbitration boom, that explosion has been muted because many
of these cases are simply no longer filed at all.245 For example,
between 2014 and 2017, 316 individual arbitration claims were
filed against AT&T, yet their customer base reached 147 million
people.246 In other words, defendants—with the blessing of the
Court—managed to disappear a large number of cases, not just from
the federal court system, but from the universe. For many plaintiffs,
defendants’ migration to arbitration has meant not just endangerment but extinction.
Well-resourced plaintiffs have not stood idly by. Instead of seeking arbitration as a forum, some plaintiffs have sought relief in state
courts.247 So, while federal civil filings have only slowly increased—
240. Id. at 344 (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes
is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”).
241. Id.
242. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 60, at 1229-30.
243. Sejal Singh & Andre Manuel, Harvard Law Students Are Taking on Forced Arbitration, THE NATION (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/harvard-lawstudents-are-taking-on-forced-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/TKY9-Y89Y?type=image].
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 14, at 650-51.
246. See id.
247. The state court caseload is not all federal plaintiffs fleeing federal court. In state court,
many plaintiffs are debt collectors and landlords, which are atypical federal court plaintiffs.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 19 (2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx [https://
perma.cc/3232-HRR7] (finding that nearly two-thirds of state court cases were contract cases,
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or in some years, remained stagnant—state court filings have risen
exponentially.248 At least one commentator, Patricia Hatamyar
Moore, found that between 1986 and 2015, federal court civil filings
increased by only 9 percent, a number that is less than the growth
in population and growth in disposable income per capita during
that same period.249 This is in stark contrast to state courts where
there has been an incredible increase in civil case filings, by some
estimates as much as 350 percent for a similar period.250
In addition, migration does not mean that evolution stops. To the
contrary, even in these new ecosystems, the parties who can do so
evolve. Because of forced arbitration agreements and the class
action waivers within them, plaintiffs have a twin-procedural challenge: the inability to litigate in court and the requirement to
individually arbitrate. In response, some parties are adapting. For
example, in the DoorDash misclassification case, employees were
ordered into individual arbitration because their agreements prohibited the aggregation of arbitrable claims.251 In response, the
DoorDash workers filed five thousand individual arbitration claims,
putting increased pressure on DoorDash to engage.252 This is but
and of those, 37 percent were debt collection, 29 percent were landlord/tenant, and 17 percent
were foreclosures).
248. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 60, at 1226-27.
249. Id. at 1181.
250. Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments
of Chief Justices Taft, Warren and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 832-33 (2012) (noting an
increase from 7.7 million civil filings in 1978 to 25 million civil filings in 2008).
251. Mulvaney, supra note 15. Uber Drivers faced a similar fate. Joel Rosenblatt, Uber
Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might Have Come up the Loser, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2019,
10:22 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-arbitration-miscalculation20190508-story.html [https://perma.cc/E6ZT-CWFP]; Alison Frankel, Forced into Arbitration,
12,500 Drivers Claim Uber Won’t Pay Fees to Launch Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:17 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber/forced-into-arbitration-12500-drivers-claimuber-wont-pay-fees-to-launch-cases-idUSKBN1O52C6 [https://perma.cc/F7JA-QZ29].
252. Charlotte Garden, DoorDash’s Multimillion-Dollar Arbitration Mistake, WASH. POST
(Feb. 16, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/16/doordashsmultimillion-dollar-arbitration-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/3D7B-UGJM]. The arbitration firm
responsible for handling these claims charged DoorDash nearly $12 million in fees. Id. Uber’s
arbitration provision similarly requires the company to pay the initial arbitration fees, a
reality that has now stalled the progress of this dispute. Charlotte Garden, Uber and Lyft
Drivers Turn the Tables on Individual Arbitration, ONLABOR (Jan. 8. 2019), https://on
labor.org/uber-and-lyft-drivers-turn-the-tables-on-individual-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/
CP9R-JYUX]. The exorbitant cost of paying for thousands of arbitrations has led Uber to
suggest bellwether arbitrations or other procedural solutions. Id.
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one example of parties’ ability to adapt not only to a new ecosystem—here, from courtroom to arbitration—but also to a new
procedure—from aggregate litigation to mass individual filings.253
The same migration-adaptation pattern can be seen in plaintiffs’
migration from federal to state court.254 In the face of a hostile
federal court environment for class actions, plaintiffs began filing
more class actions in what they perceived to be a friendlier
location—state courts.255 Defendants, the forced migrators this time,
responded by lobbying Congress to loosen the removal requirements
for these cases.256 In 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which did just that.257 CAFA forced many statecourt-filed mass and class actions to migrate to federal court.258 But,
evolution did not stop there. Plaintiffs who were still eager to be in
state court found a way around CAFA by filing mass actions in state
court with claimant numbers small enough to avoid CAFA’s removal
provisions.259 This allowed plaintiffs to migrate their cases back into
state court.260 Undeterred, defendants challenged the personal
jurisdiction of certain state courts in nationwide mass actions.261
The Supreme Court, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of California, determined that in such mass actions, the plaintiffs
must show a tight connection between the defendant and each mass
action member’s claim.262 Bristol-Myers might now result in both
adaptation and migration. First, plaintiffs who want to adjudicate
See Frankel, supra note 251.
See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
See PUB. CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS
LACKING 2 (2005), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/outlierreport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J3D7-VWVW].
257. See Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute,
35 J. LEGIS. 76, 96-98 (2009).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
259. See Linda S. Mullenix, The American Class Action Fairness Act and Forum Shopping
American-Style, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.—ISSUES & PRAC. 357, 372 (2006).
260. See id.
261. See CLEARY GOTTLIEB, U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT STATE COURTS LACK
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN NON-RESIDENTS’ CLAIMS FOR INJURIES NOT
CONNECTED TO IN-STATE CONDUCT 2-3 (2017), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/
organize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/us-supreme-court-holds-that-statecourts-lack-specific-personal-jurisdiction-to-entertain-6-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BA2RKKQ].
262. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
253.
254.
255.
256.
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in state court must file individually (or must file significantly
smaller class actions).263 They must adapt. And second, plaintiffs
(and defendants) who want the benefit of nationwide aggregate
litigation must migrate to federal court where their individual
claims might be consolidated for national multidistrict litigation.264
Finally, federal executive agencies are witnessing a slower, yet
similar migratory and adaption trend. The onset of the administrative state brought with it a large body of disputes.265 Veterans,
consumers, and immigrants rely on administrative agencies for substantive relief; yet because of the lack of funding and resources,
many of these individuals’ cases are delayed and, if decided, are decided inconsistently and with little hope of appellate oversight.266
For example, when veterans’ individual claims processing suffered
incredible delays, a group of veteran plaintiffs brought a class action

263. See id. at 1783.
264. There, of course, the claims may no longer be class actions, but they will still be
aggregated to some degree as an MDL. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation
on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2018) (“After the Supreme Court’s decision, we predict that cases
like Bristol-Myers will not be split up and litigated in state courts all over the country, as the
Court seemed to contemplate. Instead, they will wind up in MDL, which offers a means of
centralizing cases filed around the country before a single federal judge.”).
265. See, e.g., Reuel Schiller, Administrative Law: Historical Origins of America’s Administrative Exceptionalism, 1 JUDGES’ BOOK 5, 6-8 (2017).
266. Civil case filings in U.S. courts declined by 5 percent to 277,010 in 2018. Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/4T6L-TC2J]. Administrative cases
are filed in far greater numbers. For example, with social security cases, 17,192 new cases
were filed during fiscal year 2019 (October 2018 to September 2019). National New Court
Cases and Court Remand Activity FY 2019, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
appeals/DataSets/archive/08_FY201908_September_National_New_Court_Cases_and_Re
mands.html [https://perma.cc/2DX8-8HQ8]. With immigration cases, there were 504,848
initial filings during fiscal year 2019. Adjudication Statistics: New Cases and Total Completions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1238741/download [https://perma.cc/525V-B237]. Finally, for
veterans’ benefits, within the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (claims that were
already adjudicated within the Veterans’ Affairs system then move here if appealed), 6,802
appeals were filed in the fiscal year 2018 (October 2017 to September 2018). U.S. CT. VET.
APP., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT: OCTOBER 1, 2017, TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 1 (2018),
https://www.uscourts. cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y724QUTH].

386

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:345

in federal court that argued the delay amounted to a systemic due
process violation.267 The Ninth Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction over the case, so some plaintiffs filed a class action in the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims.268 That court determined that it
could not hear class actions, but the Federal Circuit reversed,
leading the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to develop a class
action rule.269 The success of this migration and adaptation by
veterans has led commentators like Adam Zimmerman and Michael
Sant’Ambrogio to argue that agency litigation could improve if
decisionmakers could resolve at least some cases through “agency”
class actions.270 Like private arbitration, some agency litigation has
been driven out of federal court and into new fora, and the parties
within that new system are adapting by pushing different procedural solutions.271
C. Extinction
Even when migration and adaptation occur, as with evolution, not
everyone can make it. The most vulnerable parties with endangered
claims are now extinct. Many commentators have noted that the
restrictive approach to procedure in federal courts has led to the
extinction of claims like civil rights violations, for example.272
Instead of serving as an environment where important substantive
rights can be vindicated, commentators argue that federal courts
are instead hostile.273 For instance, commentators have shown that
pleading restrictions under Twombly and Iqbal have impacted civil
267. Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and
Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1755 (2017).
268. Id. at 1756.
269. Id. (“In a significant decision, the Federal Circuit unanimously reversed, holding that
the CAVC has the authority to certify class actions ‘under the All Writs Act, other statutory
authority, and the Veterans Court’s inherent powers.’”).
270. Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2012) (“This Article argues that agencies should adopt
aggregation procedures, like a civil class action, to resolve common claims raised by large
groups of people in administrative courts.”).
271. See id. at 2029-34.
272. Spencer, supra note 95, at 367 (“Greater access to courts naturally increases the
volume of litigation the system must handle and presents a greater opportunity to put forth
claims asserting seemingly tenuous or disfavored rights.”).
273. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 270, at 2029-34.
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rights claims more than other claims such as contract and tort.274 A
similar trend was observed after the Court handed down its trilogy
of summary judgment cases.275 It might be that some of these claims
have migrated to other fora, like state courts, but many have also
simply disappeared.
Similarly, the impact of forced arbitration and class action waivers is difficult to measure, but as already discussed, in the wake of
Concepcion, arbitrations against AT&T precipitously dropped following the Court’s decision in that case.276 The combination of
requiring arbitration and prohibiting aggregation appears to have
eliminated any incentive for litigants to file their smaller consumer
claims. But AT&T is not the only potential defendant to use forced
arbitration clauses with class-wide waivers.277 A March 2015 study
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) explored the
impact of forced arbitration and class action waivers on consumers
in the financial product market.278 The study found that 75 percent
of consumers did not even know they were subject to these
clauses.279 Yet, according to the study, tens of millions of consumers
are bound by them.280 The CFPB further found that while 32 million
consumers were eligible for relief through consumer class action
settlements, considerably fewer consumers actually obtained relief
in arbitration.281 Only 1,060 arbitration disputes were filed by consumers during the study period, and consumers recovered a
combined total of $175,000 in damages and $190,000 in debt
forbearance.282
274. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation,
89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1195, 1227 (2014).
275. See Stempel, supra note 97, at 107-08.
276. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
277. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A)
11-12 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-tocongress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUJ4-NGZ9].
278. Id.
279. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Study Finds that Arbitration
Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers, (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.consumer
finance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limit-relief-forconsumers/ [https://perma.cc/RHR3-QXU5].
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.

388

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:345

Contrasted with the potential recovery in class action settlements, the CFPB determined that “arbitration clauses restrict
consumer relief in disputes with financial companies by limiting
class actions that provide millions of dollars in redress each year.”283
Stated differently, these clauses drove these consumer claims to
extinction. In response, the CFPB adopted a rule that would have
eliminated forced arbitration contracts with class action waivers.284
Yet, the rule never took effect because it was revoked by Congress
and the Trump administration in 2017.285 Assuming the validity of
the CFPB study, many of the financial product consumer claims
that existed before the proliferation of these arbitration clauses are
now no longer viable.
With the use of these clauses now becoming standard, companies
like Amazon and Netflix regularly include them as a matter of
course in their consumer and employment contracts.286 This leaves
NFL cheerleaders,287 Applebee’s service workers,288 and Budget car
renters289 without the ability to proceed as a class in arbitration.
Often, the lack of a class remedy means that claims are not brought
at all.290 With the advent of these clauses, it is entirely possible that
many more potential plaintiffs’ claims will cease to exist.
283. Id.
284. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (proposed July 19, 2017).
285. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55500 (removed Nov. 22, 2017).
286. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/ VV6WAGKZ] (“Signs posted in a theater in Los Angeles and a hamburger joint in East Texas
informed guests that, simply by walking in, they had agreed to arbitration. Consumer contracts with Amazon, Netflix, Travelocity, eBay and DirecTV now contain arbitration clauses.
Even Ashley Madison, the online site for adulterers, requires that clients agree to them.”).
287. See David Barron, Ex-Texans Cheerleaders Drop Lawsuit, Opt for Arbitration, HOUS.
CHRON. (July 11, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://www.chron.com/sports/texans/article/Ex-Texanscheerleaders-dismiss-lawsuit-opt-for-13064625.php [https://perma.cc/45M3-LDCZ].
288. See Saranac Hale Spencer, Applebees’ Squelches Class Action Through Arbitration
Clauses, ADR TOOLBOX (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.adrtoolbox.com/2013/12/applebeessquelches-class-action-arbitration-clause/ [https://perma.cc/XS3R-WGLG].
289. See Your Guide To Sue Budget Rent A Car In Small Claims Court, FAIRSHAKE,
https://fairshake.com/budget-rent-a-car/how-to-sue/ [https://perma.cc/6BXA-CSX4] (“Your user
agreement probably says you can’t sue Budget Rent A Car in any court ... thanks to an arbitration clause.”).
290. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 286 (“But by assembling records from
arbitration firms across the country, The Times found that between 2010 and 2014, only 505
consumers went to arbitration over a dispute of $2,500 or less.”).
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III. ENDANGERED CLAIMS & PROCEDURAL POLICY
The pattern of adaptation, migration, and extinction raises the
question of how policymakers should consider procedural changes
in the federal courts. The answer is not altogether clear, but what
is missing from the inquiry is the acknowledgment that lawyers and
litigants—like living organisms—have a strong will to survive. But
will alone is not enough. Parties who have an evolutionary advantage—in most cases, money and power—are better able to adapt or
migrate.291 Those with less power and means may go extinct.292 In
the absence of power to adapt, many claims are simply unenforceable.293 These are endangered claims.
This Part unpacks what it means to be an endangered claim by
addressing how the evolutionary forces of the litigation environment
put some claims at higher risk than others. It then explores what
policymakers can do to mitigate the loss of meritorious claims. First,
by taking an Endangered Claims Act approach to procedural reform, policymakers can better anticipate and understand how
procedural changes might impact some claims more than others.
Second, efforts to implement an Endangered Claims Act approach
will require maximal public monitoring—something that future
reforms should contemplate.
A. Endangered Claims
Litigants adapting is not a recent phenomenon. Attorneys and
their clients have always adapted to their environments to survive.294 The civil litigation system’s procedural rules and doctrines
are significant aspects of this environment.295 Thus, it is no wonder
291. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1442-43.
292. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 286.
293. See id.
294. Burbank, supra note 45, at 1442 (“It has also long been clear that plaintiffs’ lawyers
react to changes that make litigation more difficult in one court system by moving their cases
to other court systems, while defense counsel seek forum advantages for their clients by using
the tools available to them to affect the site of litigation.”).
295. As discussed in Part I, supra, procedural rules and doctrines are not the only internal
or external factors that impact modern litigation. Politics, attitudes, and power dynamics,
among other things, are significant as well.
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that parties and their attorneys are adept at working through—and
often around—procedural rules that get in their way. After all,
adaptability is a distinct advantage in law and something that will
remain constant.
The question this Article asks is how policymakers should weigh
this evolution when engaging in procedural reform. Applying a
simplified version of Darwin’s natural selection to our planet, we
can think of Earth as a natural system that rewards those who
develop traits to survive. Yet we know that our ecological system
does not develop free of outside influence. Human actions shape the
environment and, therefore, affect how organisms respond.296 Our
planet and its inhabitants are not evolving in a vacuum. Human
interference changes this natural development.297
The same is true in our civil justice system. It is not developing
in a vacuum either and policymakers should be mindful of that
reality. To do so, policymakers must think about what is valued in
our civil justice system and how certain trajectories in the evolution
discussed so far might endanger those values. For example, if public
law cases are increasingly handled in private forced arbitration
because the Court has blessed arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts,298 how might that impact broader democratic
values of participation and public discourse? Similarly, if only the
most elite litigants can impact (and benefit from) civil rulemaking,299 how does that affect the legitimacy of both the rulemaking process and the civil justice system?
To unpack this inquiry and problematize the current situation,
this Section will discuss two related trends created by the evolution
of procedure. First, this evolution—as it works now—benefits those
who are already advantaged. This preference leads to questions
about the entire system’s legitimacy. Second, and relatedly, as more
litigants and their attorneys migrate or go extinct, the federal civil
justice system becomes increasingly homogeneous. This Section
will discuss the negative implications of these two trends.
296. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1442.
297. Andrew P. Hendry, Kiyoko M. Gotanda & Erik I. Svensson, Human Influences on
Evolution, and the Ecological and Societal Consequences, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOC’Y B (Sept. 27, 2016).
298. See Silver-Greenberg & Geberoff, supra note 286.
299. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1442-43.
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First, the evolution of procedure currently benefits those who are
already the strongest.300 This evolution echoes a perversion of
Herbert Spencer’s “survival of the fittest.”301 Survival is the reward
in evolutionary biology, but that reward is not just about who is the
fastest or the strongest.302 It is about which individual has the
appropriate traits to best survive in a particular environment.303
Sometimes the trait can be strength, but sometimes it is not. The
environment is what sets the stage for which traits are “naturally”
selected.304
In a previous article, I argued that procedures in the federal justice system tend to benefit the most elite parties and their attorneys.305 That is because the rules are largely formulated by elite
actors who have a certain kind of experience with litigation and who
reflect that experience in their policy making.306 As I argued then,
one of the problems with elite-focused policy making is that it tends
to underestimate, or miss entirely, how the rules that are adopted
might negatively impact claims by non-elite parties.307 It also makes
room for policymakers who are indifferent or hostile to certain
claims to create a system that will exterminate those claims
altogether.308 The same is true in our procedural system overall. To
put it simply, the current procedural ecosystem rewards power.
Relatedly, where so much power is consolidated into one group
without sufficient safeguards, opportunities for corruption increase.
Elizabeth Burch’s work on repeat players demonstrates that
300. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1013-14.
301. David Weinstein, Herbert Spencer, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2019) (noting that in 1864 in Principles of Biology, Herbert
Spencer coined the term “survival of the fittest” to describe Darwin’s natural selection theory).
302. Heather Scoville, Survival of the Fittest vs. Natural Selection, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 11,
2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/survival-of-the-fittest-1224578 [https://perma.cc/4ZGMX6GB].
303. Id. (“Individuals that survive aren’t always the strongest, fastest, or smartest....
[Darwin] intended ‘fittest’ to mean the members of the species best suited for the immediate
environment, the basis of the idea of natural selection.”).
304. See id.
305. Coleman, supra note 131, at 1008.
306. Id. at 1009 (“[T]he entire civil litigation system is captured by lawyers, judges, and
parties that, while participating in the rarest litigation, inevitably bend the rules of the civil
litigation system toward their best interests.”).
307. Id. at 1041 (“[P]rocedures designed by the one percent are concerning because they fail
to account for how such procedures will affect different kinds of litigation.”).
308. Id. at 1060-61.
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unchecked power—on either the plaintiffs’ or defendants’ side—can
create an environment where attorneys might not do what is best
for their clients.309 For example, in the NFL concussion litigation,
there have been repeated allegations that the co-lead counsel in the
case, while receiving most of the $100 million in attorneys’ fees, has
not put the plaintiffs’ best interests at the forefront.310 Similar
allegations have been made in other MDLs such as the vaginal
mesh litigation.311
Further, even if these corruptive behaviors are rare, the legitimacy of the entire system is still called into question.312 If
marginalized litigants are unable to participate in a court process
or are unable to access the court at all, they will question whether
the system can work for them.313 This perception can have a
deteriorating effect on our society because a portion of our population is simply prohibited from accessing justice, and thus, further
marginalized.314
Finally, along with legitimacy, there are structural problems.
Biodiversity is necessary for natural environments to flourish.315
309. Burch, supra note 109, at 95-101 (discussing the perverse incentives created by
multidistrict litigation and how repeat-player plaintiff and defense attorneys are affected).
310. Dom Cosentino, The NFL Concussion Settlement Just Keeps Getting Worse And Worse,
DEADSPIN (May 17, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-nfl-concussion-settlement-justkeeps-getting-worse-1834651117 [https://perma.cc/75MS-AFAT].
311. Matthew Goldstein, Women Who Sued Makers of Pelvic Mesh Are Suing Their Own
Lawyers, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/
business/pelvic-mesh-surgery-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/2JD4-7ZV9] (noting that “the
average $60,000 settlement—before deducting legal fees and other costs—has prompted
frustration” among vaginal mesh plaintiffs).
312. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating that the vaginal mesh suits brought attention to “some
of the bad practices that can occur in mass tort cases, which sometimes operate like an
assembly line, with lawyers rushing to sign up as many clients as they can and plaintiffs
never getting a chance to speak to a lawyer”).
313. See generally Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 286 (describing one small
restaurant owner’s disenchantment with the judicial system after bringing a simple antitrust
lawsuit against American Express and facing strategized alliance of corporate superpowers).
314. ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 30 (2017) (noting that lawsuits enforcing
individual rights “can [also] hold people and organizations accountable, and they can open the
flow of information to the public and equalize the playing field in a way that reaffirms our
collective commitment to mutual respect”).
315. Julie Shaw, Why Is Biodiversity Important? CONSERVATION INT’L (May 17, 2021),
https://www.conservation.org/blog/why-is-biodiversity-important [https://perma.cc/57YJPRXT]; Biodiversity & Human Well-being, GREENFACTS, https://www.greenfacts.org/en/
biodiversity/l-3/1-define-biodiversity.htm [https://perma.cc/RF4M-QWBN].
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The same is true for the civil justice system because homogeneity
may very well lead to an unsustainable environment. As particular
procedures have taken hold and driven claims extinct or out of the
system, we have already seen the nature of our civil justice system
shift to one that serves only a chosen few.316
The failure to recognize these inherent inequities when adopting
procedural reforms is problematic. First, it tips the scale in favor of
parties who are already advantaged.317 Second, it opens the civil
justice system up to questions about its legitimacy.318 And third, it
leaves largely unchecked the power that proliferates in litigation.319
In other words, because of policymakers’ current approach to procedural reform, the civil justice system is open to corruptive
behaviors and questions about whether it can legitimately resolve
grievances when less advantaged parties litigate against bigger fish.
If the evolution of procedure continues as is, these problems will
only increase. The parties and lawyers who are surviving are becoming more and more homogeneous over time.320 And money and
power are distinct advantages within litigation.321 Yet the civil
justice system is not some organic system out of our control. It is a
system created by human beings, and thus, it is a system that can
change what traits are rewarded.
B. An Endangered Claims Act Approach
It is this inequity that should concern policymakers as they
attempt to craft optimal procedures. Grievances will persist, claims
will arise, and litigants with means will continue to pursue them.
This is why who has access to that resolution and where that
resolution takes place really matters. While not the exclusive influence, procedure plays a large role in determining both access and
location.322 Thus, if the goal is to design optimal procedure, we must
316. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1008.
317. See id. at 1009.
318. See Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J. 1141, 1156 (2015).
319. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1029.
320. See Burch, supra note 121, at 86.
321. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1029.
322. See id. at 1011.
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consider the evolutionary advantages of some parties and their
claims.
Currently, policymakers tend to take a reactive approach to
procedural reform.323 For example, the Court changed course on arbitration in response to an impulse that the civil litigation system
is inefficient.324 The civil rulemaking committee similarly engaged
in discovery reform by responding to a small number of cases where
discovery costs are outsized.325 This reactivity by policymakers may
arguably solve the issue right in front of them, but it does not
account for the evolutionary reality of the entire environment in
which procedure operates.
Procedural reform should protect claims; thus, we should think
of claims as something of an endangered species. To that end, while
an act of Congress is unlikely, policymakers should still approach
their work in an Endangered Claims Act posture where claim conservation is paramount. Of course, not all claims can be saved.
Saving all individuals in a species is not the goal of the Endangered
Species Act either.326 Instead, procedural reform should be undertaken with an appreciation that—to the extent possible—meritorious claims are to be protected.
Darwin’s natural selection theory posited that any species with a
trait that is most favorable to its current environment has a better
chance of surviving and, thus, a better chance of passing that trait
on to future generations.327 He wrote that any “variation[ ] useful to
323. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 23.
324. See infra notes 362-66 and accompanying text. The Court expressed similar concerns
in its most recent pleading cases. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“It
is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless,
be weeded out early in the discovery process through ‘careful case management,’ ... given the
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been
on the modest side.” (citation omitted)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (“We
decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the
Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery.”).
325. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
326. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531; see also Michael A. DiSabatino, Validity, Construction, and Application of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543), 32 AM. L. REPS. FED.
332 (1977). The purpose of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was to “provide for
conservation, protection and propagation of endangered species” in a way that the previous
Acts of 1966 and 1969 did not achieve. Id. § 2(a). The amended act promulgated an endangered list and broadened the protections for plant and animal species listed as threatened or
endangered. Id.
327. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 118 (1859).
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any organic being” that occurred would give the individuals that had
such a variation “the best chance of being preserved in the struggle
for life.”328 A critical question in evolutionary biology is at what level
to place the unit of selection.329 For example, when scientists observed lions and successful hunting patterns, all manner of evolutionary advantages were noted.330 Lions have muscular jaws,
sharp teeth, and speed; yet, some lions still starve to death.331 What
scientists discovered is that starving lions often hunted alone while
the lions who hunted in packs thrived.332 This led some scientists to
determine that the unit of selection—the thing that makes the
species most successful—is hunting in packs.333 This trait benefits
other levels of the species, of course. From the cells that make up
the lion’s mere existence to the influence the pride of lions will have
on their environment, the evolutionary impact of the animal
cascades.334 But some surmise that the unit of selection that privileges it all—at least with respect to lions—could very well be the
trait of hunting by pack.335
As noted earlier, the Court, Congress, and rulemakers treat
money and power as the meaningful units of selection in procedural reform. Their reforms reflect that influence.336 The rulemakers’
discovery reform was driven by the litigants who had the most to
gain from restrictive discovery.337 In addition, courts repeatedly

328. Id.
329. See id. at 119-20.
330. BRIAN BERTRAM, PRIDE OF LIONS 117, 119 (1978).
331. See id. at 242.
332. See id. at 97.
333. See id.
334. Cf. DARWIN, supra note 327, at 119-20.
335. BERTRAM, supra note 330, at 119-21; see also Bernard J. Crespi, Selection: Units and
Levels, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SCIENCES 5 (2001), https://ncbs.res.in/sitefiles/4.Levels-ofSelection.pdf [https://perma.cc/37PS-25FC] (“Social cooperation and altruism within groups
has evolved via selection for maximization of inclusive fitness by each individual, whereby
within-group individual selfishness is countered more or less successfully by between-group
advantages to cooperating. Mechanisms helping to enforce cooperation include recognition of
group membership and joint suppression (‘policing’) of selfish individuals.” (citation omitted)).
336. See Coleman, supra note 131, at 1013-14.
337. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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uphold forced arbitration agreements that often include class action
prohibitions.338 These agreements primarily benefit large corporations and repeat-player defendants.339 Finally, congressional procedural reforms cater to well-resourced parties as well; for example,
defendants who perceived state courts to be unfair class-action fora
spearheaded the Class Action Fairness Act.340
To achieve claim conservation in the civil justice system,
policymakers should consider the claim—not the party’s money and
power—as the evolutionary unit of selection. An Endangered Claims
Act approach would focus policymakers on substantive claims.
While substantive rights are at the heart of the civil justice system,
policymakers reward other units of selection, like the loudest
lawyers and the most resourced clients.341 They have focused on the
muscular jaw of the lion, if you will, while giving short shrift to the
pack-hunting advantage.342 By refocusing policymakers on how
many claims have become endangered, they might step away from
the perverted “survival of the fittest” approach they seem to have
embraced.343 Doing so will force policymakers to think about how
power operates. They would consider how they should be less concerned with the identity of the party, and more concerned with the
impact a particular reform will have on valid substantive claims.
A recent procedural reform—the adoption of proportionality in
the discovery rules—provides a ready example of how the unit of
selection is the party and her attorney, not the claim.344 There, the
policymakers singularly focused on the most extreme litigation in
which discovery costs are quite high.345 But nowhere in the consideration of proportionality did the rulemakers consider the impact of
proportionality on run-of-the-mill litigation.346 Multiple attorneys
testified that the proportionality change would negatively impact
338. See, e.g., Singh & Manuel, supra note 243.
339. See Press Release, supra note 279.
340. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
341. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 286.
342. See BERTRAM, supra note 330, at 121.
343. See Weinstein, supra note 301.
344. See Thomas & Price, supra note 318, at 1149.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1155 (arguing that “[f]or many on the Committee, the ‘typical’ litigation experience appears to be the atypical case,” so rulemakers do not consider the impact of rule
changes on cases with which they are unfamiliar).

2021]

ENDANGERED CLAIMS

397

their litigation, but the policymakers generally responded that
district court judges could be trusted to manage that difficulty—a
judgment that may very well be true in some cases, but not all.347
Moreover, the Advisory Committee conducted no studies to determine the impact of proportionality on these cases, although there
was good evidence that cases in the main otherwise worked just
fine.348
Using the claim instead of the party as the unit of selection might
have led to a different policy choice. Looking specifically at the
kinds of cases that many commentators thought would be most
affected—employment discrimination, product liability, and civil
rights cases, for example—the policymakers might have determined
that such a procedural reform should focus on those cases.349 If
proportionality would negatively impact those claims, maybe proportionality should be the exception, not the rule.350 Stated differently, by looking at the claims impacted by this change and focusing
less on the parties who stood to gain the most from the change,
policymakers might have flipped the script. They could have left the
current rules in place and empowered courts—in their discretion—to require proportionality in the minority of cases where it
might make sense.351 This kind of procedural reform would have
given primacy to claims, not parties.

347. Id. at 1156-57 (arguing that the proportionality changes will indeed impact cases such
as employment discrimination cases more harshly than others); Hatamyar Moore, supra note
193, at 1140 (“The speakers during three days of public hearings before the Advisory Committee were almost perfectly polarized in their reaction to the proposed amendments:
plaintiffs’ lawyers and legal academics against, defense lawyers and corporate representatives
in favor.” (footnote omitted)).
348. Thomas & Price, supra note 318, at 1145-46.
349. See id. at 1156-57.
350. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. L. REV. 377, 392 (2010) (“About a half
or a third of civil lawsuits (depending on the study) have no discovery, and the cases that
utilize discovery frequently do not have more than two or three discovery incidents, perhaps
a deposition or two and a set of interrogatories.”). Some preliminary studies have already
shown that proportionality limited discovery for some litigants. Gregory L. Waterworth,
Comment, Proportional Discovery’s Anticipated Impact and Unanticipated Obstacle, 47 U.
BALT. L. REV. 139, 163 (2017) (“Although it is incredibly difficult to definitively say, the new
Rule 26(b)(1) seems to be narrowing the scope of discovery.”) (citing studies).
351. Of course, arguably, that is how the rule read before the committee amended it. Rule
26(b)(2)(C) gave courts discretion to limit discovery that was disproportionate.
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It is not only rulemakers who should be conscious claim conservators, however. The Supreme Court could have taken a different
approach in its arbitration jurisprudence by looking at the nature
of the claim, not the parties to the arbitration agreement. Setting
aside the argument that the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is
critically difficult to square with the original text and intent of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),352 the Court could still better account
for how procedure evolves by being less concerned with the potential
litigants and more concerned with the nature of the claims covered
by these agreements. The Court could have done this in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.353 There, the Court determined that even though parties would not bring low-stakes antitrust claims individually, the FAA required enforcement of the class
action waiver.354 The Court held “a contractual waiver of class
arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when
the plaintiff ’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory
claim exceeds the potential recovery.”355
The Court could have instead determined that the enforcement
of antitrust violations would be thwarted by a class action waiver in
a forced arbitration agreement. That decision would have amplified
the nature of the claim as the unit of selection and diminished the
parties. Instead, the Court appeared to be more concerned that
defendants should not be subject to the expense that class arbitration might create.356 That concern motivated the decision in Italian
Colors, as it had similarly done in most of the Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence.357

352. June Lehrman, On the Threshold of Arbitration: Whether A Court or Arbitrator
Decides a Threshold Arbitration Issue Hinges on Whether the Issue Involves A Question of
Arbitrability, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2003, at 20-26, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lalback-issues/2003-issues/december-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQN3-MB99]; Lyra Haas, Note,
The Endless Battleground: California’s Continued Opposition to the Supreme Court’s Federal
Arbitration Act Jurisprudence, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1419, 1458 (2014).
353. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
354. Id. at 236 (“The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting
parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy than did
federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938.”).
355. Id. at 231.
356. See id. at 240-41 (Kagan, J., dissenting). This is a dubious policy reason, but we should
set that aside as well. See id. at 244-46.
357. See id. at 231 (majority opinion).
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But imagine if the Court took a different approach to its adjudication. Where evenly resourced parties negotiated arbitration
clauses—and even class action waivers—the Court might enforce
those agreements.358 After all, the parties have chosen, with true
consent, to opt out of the public civil justice system and into a
private one.359 However, where parties are unevenly resourced and
the claim at issue is one of public concern, the Court might not
enforce such arbitration agreements.360 The Court might require
that any enforcement be contingent on actual consent, meaning
that arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion would not be
enforced. Similarly, the Court might enforce forced arbitration
agreements, but not allow class action waivers where the prohibition of a class action would effectively eliminate the parties’ ability
to adjudicate the claim. For example, in Italian Colors, the dissent
noted that the inability to arbitrate the claim as a class effectively
eliminated the ability to arbitrate the claim at all.361 In that way,
the dissent gave primacy to the claim instead of the powerful parties
who created the arbitration clauses in the first place.
Forum selection clauses are no different. Again, imagine a different world. Cases like The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., where
evenly matched parties negotiated a forum selection clause at arms’
length, would be decided similarly.362 There, the breach of contract
claim might be better decided in the designated forum. Moreover,
the parties to the agreement both clearly chose that forum and
method of resolution.363 Bremen, however, is in direct contrast to
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.364 In that case, the Court
enforced a forum selection clause in a contract of adhesion.365 The
358. See id. at 244-46 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
359. See Lehrman, supra note 352, at 20.
360. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Schute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing uneven contracting in the forum selection clause context).
361. 570 U.S. at 249 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority conjures a special reason to
exclude ‘class-action waiver[s]’ from the effective-vindication rule’s compass.... [and] the
majority notes, [Rule 23] became law only in 1938—decades after the Sherman Act. The
majority’s conclusion: If federal law in the interim decades did not eliminate a plaintiff’s
rights under that Act, then neither does this agreement.” (citation omitted)).
362. See 407 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1972).
363. See id.
364. See 499 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
365. See id.
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parties did not negotiate at arms’ length.366 In addition, the claim—
one of negligence on the part of a common carrier—is one that would
be of greater public interest.367 Individuals are more likely to purchase a ticket and unwittingly agree to such terms.368 Had the Court
prioritized the claim when thinking about this procedural reform,
it would have enforced the forum selection clause in Bremen and
rendered void the same clause in Carnival Cruise Lines.
Making the unit of selection in procedural reform the claim—
and not the party—would benefit other levels of the civil justice
system. Just as lions benefit from pack-hunting individually and as
a species, the benefit of claim conservation can inure the entire civil
justice system. A claim-based approach to procedural reform would
not only better serve substantive claims, it would increase the
legitimacy of the civil justice system.369 Unstacking the deck against
less resourced parties would have a functional impact and would
benefit the perception of the whole system as well.370
Finally, using the claim as the unit of selection could completely
change the transsubstantive nature of procedure.371 As these examples show, if policymakers consider the claim as their primary
concern instead of giving primacy to parties, there might be different rules for different claims. And because transsubstantivity
works to cloak policymakers’ nascent hostility to certain claims,
policymakers would be less able to target some claims under the
guise of targeting them all.372 When a procedural change is made,
policymakers can say that the reform has only “inadvertently”
affected some claims more than others.373 After all, the change is the
same across the board. Increasingly, scholars have seriously questioned the necessity of transsubstantive procedure.374 Perhaps a
366. See id. at 597.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See Resnik, supra note 223, at 2835-36 (arguing that fair and open court proceedings
create legitimacy).
370. See id.
371. See Subrin, supra note 350, at 392.
372. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA.
L. REV. 319, 334 (2008) (“[S]ubstantive policy is always a part of procedural justification.”).
373. See id.
374. See, e.g., id. at 324, 333-34 (advocating against transsubstantivity as an “independent value” of the civil rules); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
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consideration of endangered claims provides yet another argument
for moving away from that norm.
C. Enforcing Claim Conservation
An Endangered Claims Act approach to procedural reform will
only be successful if it can be monitored. Just as the Endangered
Species Act depends on an administrative agency and private
parties to enforce it, rethinking policymakers’ approach to procedural reform similarly requires monitoring. That monitoring requires two related changes in the current approach to procedural
reform. First, policymakers must consider which fora are best suited
for claim monitoring. Second, policymakers must have better information about what happens to claims once they are subject to
procedural reforms.
To best monitor how claims are faring, we must be able to observe them like species in the wild. In the civil justice system, the
optimal location for such scrutiny is in the courts.375 There, the
effectiveness of claim conservation can be more easily monitored
simply because most of the proceedings are open to the public. This
is in stark contrast to arbitration, which is veiled in privacy and
without a public monitoring mechanism.376
Thus, instead of being agnostic, policymakers should give preference to courts. Claim conservation requires better monitoring and
public courts offer that systemic advantage.377 Courts, while still
quite fallible, are required to manage evolutionary power dynamics
in public, making their actions both accountable and traceable.378
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (“[U]niformity and
trans-substantivity ... are a sham.”); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Transsubstantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010) (discussing the
history and precarious existence of transsubstantivity).
375. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 244-46 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (citing confidentiality provisions as a large part of the problem with arbitration
agreements).
376. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 680
(2018) (“While it is important not to overstate the contrast between arbitration and litigation,
there is no doubt that much more of the arbitral process is shielded from public view.”);
Resnik, supra note 223, at 2836.
377. See Resnik, supra note 223, at 2836.
378. See id.
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Individual judges might still favor better-resourced parties, but
when they do so, they are being watched.379
Public access and accounting on their own are not enough though.
In addition to simply having access to how claims are adjudicated,
an approach that gives primacy to claims requires better information gathering. Scientists do not merely observe the environment;
they gather data. Information is required to determine what is
really happening in any particular fora to any particular species.
Similarly, here, to better understand what claims are endangered
and whether those claims are valid, we must put better information
gathering mechanisms in place.
While there is some information currently available about cases
filed in federal and state court, that information has limitations.380
For example, in the federal courts, system-wide data on case disposition is tracked in two ways—pretrial and trial.381 There is no
system-wide tracking of how many cases end in motions to dismiss
or motions for summary judgment.382 That basic lack of information
prevents us from understanding how specific procedural reforms
are working on the ground. While one-off studies have been done to
determine such information, policymakers should not have to rely
on academic efforts or requested studies by the Federal Judicial
Center to understand basic aspects of how our federal civil justice
system works.383
If policymakers are armed with basic information about how the
civil justice system functions, then they will be better able to foresee
how procedural reforms might impact certain claims. This work can
happen both before and after reforms are adopted. With better
379. See id.
380. See Zambrano, supra note 39, at 2110-11.
381. Table C-4, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, During the 12-month Period Ending June 30, 2019, U.S. CTS. (June 30, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2019/06/30
[https://perma.cc/AHD8-66RB] (showing the disposition of cases organized by pretrial and
trial).
382. See id.
383. For example, the Civil Rulemaking Committee requested a study of motion to dismiss
rates following the Court’s decision in Iqbal. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET
S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED. JUD. CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MotionIqbal.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B996-YNAY].
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information on the front end, policymakers might be able to make
better predictions about how a procedural change will fare. Moreover, after a new procedure is adopted, a body like the Federal Judicial Center could track and monitor the impact of that procedural
change on claims and share that information.384 Policymakers would
then understand how a change is actually working across all claims.
Of course, there are drawbacks to this approach. First, there is a
danger in vesting courts with too much power. This might be
especially true in state courts where many judges are elected and
where there is more room for influence and corruption.385 Second,
while federal courts have stabilized in terms of workload, state
courts have not.386 State courts are far busier, and the influx of additional claims might so overwhelm those courts that procedural
reforms will not make a difference.387 Third, information is useful,
but how the information is used matters more. As we have seen in
other contexts such as civil rulemaking, money and power can still
greatly influence how policymakers value particular kinds of information. Finally, other interventions might work better. It would be
optimal, for example, if litigants had better access to lawyers and
legal aid. Yet, because those types of interventions are quite unlikely in the current political climate, keeping claims in the public
court system remains the best choice in our current ecosystem.
D. Testing the Hypothesis
The current global pandemic provides a ready natural experiment for the endangered claims hypothesis. In response to the
pandemic, at the end of March 2020, the Judicial Conference of the
United States provided temporary approval of video and teleconferencing access in civil and criminal proceedings.388 Even the
Supreme Court moved to livestreamed teleconferencing.389 These
384. See supra note 381 and accompanying text (describing current tracking activities).
385. See Zambrano, supra note 39, at 2146 (discussing scholarship on judicial elections).
386. See id. at 2189.
387. See id.; see also supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
388. Judiciary Authorizes Video/Audio Access During COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. CTS.
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/03/31/judiciary-authorizes-videoaudioaccess-during-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/SMG9-F567].
389. Press Release, U.S. Sup. Ct., Media Advisory Regarding October Teleconference
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changes were made swiftly in response to the pandemic.390 They
were not lobbied for or sought after, but they benefited many.391
Courts were able to resume many of their day-to-day operations
while keeping the judges, court staff, parties, and lawyers safe.392
It is worth remembering, though, that advocates had long called
for technological advances in court access and that most of the
federal bench, led by the Supreme Court, had long resisted such
calls.393 Until now, the biggest technological advance by the federal
judiciary had been its electronic case filing system.394 The advent of
remote court hearings in the COVID era has the potential to
profoundly increase access to the courts, even after the pandemic
ends. While there are downsides to the federal courts’ response to
the pandemic, such as an unwillingness to hold jury trials remotely
and the insistence by some judges on in-person appearances,395
overall, the response has been swift and inclusive.
Yet, this response to COVID-19 proves the endangered-claims
point. The viability of these adaptations depended solely on the
interests at stake. When elite judges and lawyers were at risk—as
they were when the pandemic began—accommodating changes to
court administrative procedures were made. Yet, marginalized individuals—those with disabilities or economic barriers to access—
previously made such calls for reform.396 The system saw fit to
Argument Audio (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/
ma_10-01-20 [https://perma.cc/YW9X-U33X].
390. Courts Continue to Adapt to Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/courts-continue-adapt-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/VP8P-D5F6].
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. Ariane de Vogue, No Cameras, Please: How the Supreme Court Shuns the Spotlight,
CNN (Oct. 6, 2017, 6:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/06/politics/supreme-court-tvcameras-transparency/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2S3-G476].
394. See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Technology and the Courts: A Futurist View, AM. BAR ASS’N
(July 1, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2013/
summer/technology_and_the_courts_a_futurist_view/ [https://perma.cc/A5JM-TJUF].
395. Madison Alder, Jasmine Ye Han & Andrew Wallender, Federal Courts Respond to
Covid-19: Live Map, BLOOMBERG L. (May 5, 2021, 5:14 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
us-law-week/arguments-axed-access-limited-courts-respond-to-covid-19-map
[https://perma.cc/9WDE-HT3F].
396. J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology,
70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 2010 (2017) (noting that many state courts have been considering
reforms and that “technology-enhanced access is already on the minds of some state court
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change only when powerful actors called for it. This response is
evidence of the perverse survival-of-the-fittest approach at the heart
of endangered claims.
What we now know and can learn from this natural experiment
is that it need not be this way. Instead of responding to the most
privileged, policymakers should engage in procedural reform by
intentionally considering the ecological realities of our civil justice
system. That means taking account of how those with the least
power might fare.
CONCLUSION
To sufficiently account for this inequity, policymakers must more
seriously consider that in response to procedural change, parties
will adapt, migrate, or go extinct. The current system of procedural
reform rewards traits like money and power and endangers claims
brought by those who lack resources. An optimal approach to reform
would function quite differently. Policymakers, instead of taking a
distorted survival-of-the-fittest approach, would adopt an Endangered Claims Act approach in which the focus would no longer be on
the parties and their attorneys, but on meritorious claims. Claims,
like organisms, function differently in variant environments. Thus,
in order to understand how claims will fare when a new procedure
is adopted, policymakers must have better information, and the
claims, to the extent possible, must be observable in our public
courts. Like environmental conservation efforts, applying an Endangered Claims Act methodology to procedural reform will return
our civil justice system to one where more meritorious claims can
flourish.

reformers who see the part that court-access barriers play in denying people justice, even in
more complex cases”).

